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THE NEW PUBLIC LAW MOVEMENT: 
MODERATION AS A POSTMODERN 
CULTURAL FORM 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. * 
and Gary Peller** 
The past twenty years have witnessed an explosion of public law 
scholarship, as legal scholars reconceptualized themes of administra-
tive law, legislation, and constitutional law; created almost from 
scratch whole new areas of public law scholarship, including discrimi-
nation, environmental, and consumer protection theory; and enlivened 
discourse with concepts drawn from microeconomiqs, public choice 
theory, civic republicanism, practical philosophy, and hermeneutics. 
This intellectually intense activity has suggested the possibility that 
public law discourse has entered a "critical stage"1 and stimulated the 
Michigan Law Review to hold a conference in October 1990 on 
whether there is something that might be called "New Public Law." 
At first we thought there certainly was. We still do, but on further 
reflection we think that the more interesting inquiry is how these new 
developments in public law relate to the recent politicization of 
jurisprudence. . 
This inquiry was a daunting project for us, in part· because the 
complexity of the historical analysis and our tendency toward abstrac-
tion continually threatened to blur the focus of the inquiry, namely, to 
identify and analyze a "movement" within legal scholarship. Also~ we 
approached the topic from very different perspectives. One of us 
viewed the New Public Law as an exciting positive development, the 
other viewed it with skepticism. What we needed was a method for 
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concretizing the discussion and for presenting its historical complexity 
and for allowing us to explore our own differences of perspective. 
Based upon these concerns, we have chosen to focus on two state court 
cases, one involving nuclear protesters and the other involving a Cath-
olic university's refusal to recognize a gay and lesbian student group. 
We use these cases as a grounding to present three accounts of twenti-
eth-century American legal thought, each of which illuminates new 
developments in public law in a different but perhaps complementary 
way. 
The first story is a fairly conventional one, focusing on the con-
tinuity of modem legal discourse and the way in which recent public 
law scholarship carries on the legal process tradition. This account 
emphasizes the legal process synthesis, which constituted a new center 
for American law, a center that denied the legal realists' "extreme" 
charges, even while assimilating the ideological assumptions of the 
New Deal into a strong and systematic philosophy supportive of the 
new elite-endorsed status quo in America. By 1958, legal process the-
ory had achieved consensus status in legal academic circles, a consen-
sus that has dominated public law scholarship for the past thirty years. 
Challenges from law and economics and critical legal studies (CLS) in 
the 1970s have undermined legal process' intellectual prestige in legal 
discourse, yet the legal process focus on institutional relationships, the 
process of lawmaking, and an overriding standard of purposive coher-
ence continues to dominate public law scholarship. Indeed, most of 
the new developments in public law scholarship - civic republican-
ism, public choice theory, and law and interpretation - are still usu-
ally presented in legal process ways. 
If the first story is one of continuity, the second story is one of 
generational and political rupture. At the same time that elite legal 
scholars were crafting the legal process materials, oppositionist law-
yers, activists, and scholars were challenging the system of racial 
apartheid through the civil rights movement. The generation of schol-
ars that followed the legal process founders (our generation of baby-
boomers) was molded by the civil rights movement and by the con-
comitant critique of the political theory underlying the legal process 
philosophy. What might truly be called New Public Law has been a 
rethinking of political assumptions by legal scholars in the 1970s and 
1980s. The key intellectual moves include an antipluralism which re-
jects the idea that political preferences are exogenous to politics; an 
embrace of the normativity of law, i.e., that law's legitimacy depends 
upon substantive justice and not procedural correctness; and a practi-
cal reasoning which seeks to reconcile colliding community norms 
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through dialogue and reconciliation. The New Public Law philosophy 
is evident across the various public law categories. 
Our third version of the development of a New Public Law schol-
arship describes it as a genre in the particular context of the polariza-
tion of academic legal discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. There is 
nothing inevitable about the continuation and reform of the legal pro-
cess ideology that we describe in the first two sections. In part, what 
identifies the New Public Law as a genre of scholarship is a genera-
lized sense of writers making similar choices in a relatively charged 
ideological setting. As a movement, the New Public Law is unmistak-
ably situated as a "center" between what is perceived as an overly 
objectivist and conservative law and economics and an overly con-
frontational and politicizing CLS. In our description, the New Public 
Law contains two roughly distinct subgroups that echo this external 
structure: New Public Law scholarship focusing on public choice the-
ory and on the "fit" of social problem and regulatory mechanism is a 
subdued version of the technocratic tendencies of the law-and-eco-
nomics right; the emphasis on indeterminacy and the inevitability of 
choice in a distinctly progressive wing of New Public Law scholarship 
is likewise an echo of the left's emphasis on the politics of social con-
struction. A great part of the attraction of the movement relates to the 
fact that it is generally tilted toward the left in terms of its intellectual 
positions. This intellectual overlap is evident in the proclaimed rejec-
tion of "positivist" or "objectivist" epistemology that lends a 
postmodern feature to a significant amount of New Public Law schol-
arship even if one would not think of the work as avant garde in any 
other sense. Like characteristic CLS work, the New Public Law 
scholarship rejects objectivist imagery about law. Law does not reside 
in a text, waiting to be pulled out by a subject (formalism), nor is it 
law simply because the subject declaring it is the duly established insti-
tution (legal process). Instead, law is socially constructed, a matter of 
continuous popular, as well as institutional, interpretation. This 
powerfully radical idea links the New Public Law to CLS. 
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PROCEDURALISM AND THE NEW 
LEGAL PROCESS 
At the center of our first story (the story of continuity) is the legal 
process synthesis that evolved in the period between 1940 and 1958.2 
2. We use these dates because they represent the publication dates of two legal process clas-
sics: L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940), which represented mainstream aca-
demics' rejection of legal realism and the beginnings of their quest for a unified way of thinking 
about law, and H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
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The legal process position represented a victory over opposing legal 
ideologies, particularly the common law formalists, who represented a 
conservatism repudiated by the New Deal, as well as the critical legal 
realists, who argued that all law is politics and thereby impugned the 
neutrality and legitimacy of law. Like the. realists, for example, the 
process theorists viewed law as purposive and dynamic, but protected 
the legitimacy and objectivity of law by focusing on the process and 
institutions by which law evolved. 
Legal process transformed public law discourse, legitimating the 
modern regulatory state without sacrificing its flexibility in a dynamic 
world. But from the beginning, legal process theory was beset by a 
tension between its legitimating methodology (proceduralism and in-
stitutional competence) and its goal (dynamic purposive law). That 
tension generated both liberal and conservative legal process tradi-
tions. Over time, external attacks from the right Qaw and economics) 
and the left (CLS) exacerbated this internal t~nsion. There emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s a distinctively progressive movement within the 
legal process tradition, but also seeking to transform that tradition, by 
shifting its focus decisively from proceduralism and institutional com-
petence to dynamic purposive law that meets the community's sub-
stantive needs. This is a "new" movement, but more a "new legal 
process" than a watershed in thinking about public law. 
We want to tell this story in more detail by reference to the "Case 
of the Nuclear Protesters," State v. Warshow. 3 John Warshow and his 
colleagues traveled to Vernon, Vermont, to. protest against alleged 
safety risks at the main gate of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power 
plant and to prevent it from restarting after a shut-down· for repairs. 
After refusing requests by Vermont Yankee and the police to leave the 
plant, Warshow and his colleagues were arrested for criminal trespass. 
At trial, they invoked the defense of necessity, which privileges other-
wise criminal conduct when the harm or evil sought to be avoided by 
such conduct is greater than the values protected by the criminal pro-
hibition. They tried to present evidence that there was good reason for 
them to have believed that the Vermont Yankee plant presented an 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958), which is the classic synthesis of legal process 
thought. Other well-known legal process works of this period are H. HART & H. WECHSLER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on 
the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616 (1949) [hereinafter Fuller, Spe/uncean Explorers]; Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (circulated in draft fonn during 
1950s and excerpted in H. HART & A. SACKS, supra, at 421-26); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law - A Reply to Professor [H.L.A.j Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958); Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
3. 138 Vt. 22, 410 A.2d 1000 (1979). 
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imminent danger to the community because of perceived defects that 
could have led to a meltdown. The trial judge refused to admit that 
evidence and refused to present Warshow's necessity defense to the 
jury. After conviction in the jury trial, the defendants appealed to the 
Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the convictions. 
A. From Common Law Formalism to Legal Process 
The morphogenesis of serious and sustained American public law 
scholarship is a complicated story whose contours are only now be-
coming apparent. 4 We do not propose to tell that story in any detail 
here, and will be content to suggest one historic dynamic. To do so, 
we will show how the historical structure of American public law dis-
course is evident in the three opinions by the Vermont justices in War-
shaw. The intellectual elements of this dynamic include an initial 
baseline of rule-like formalism, reflected by the majority opinion in 
Warshaw; a dramatic attack of that approach through legal realism; 
and then a resolution, reflected in the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, through a focus on proceduralism and institutional decisionmak-
ing boundaries. 
We start with common law formalism, the ideology accepted by 
elite legal society in the 1890s and in ensuing decades.5 It accepted the 
primacy of the "private" sphere over the "public" sphere - "private" 
property was the starting point, and consented-to arrangements (con-
tracts, wills, marriages, leases) were the modes of change. Unless the 
4. An excellent discussion of the intellectual background of legal process is E. PURCELL, 
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 
(1973). Our account in this Part draws heavily upon this source and upon Deutsch, Neutrality, 
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Laws and Political Science, 20 
STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968); Eskridge, Metaprocedure (Book Review), 98 YALE L.J. 945 (1989); 
Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE PoLmcs OF LA w: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRmQUE 13 (D. Kairys rev. ed. 1990); Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 561 (1988); Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 412 (1983); White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual 
History, 40 SW. L.J. 819 (1986). 
5. We consider common law formalism to be something more than the traditional under-
standing of formalism as simply a closed system of rules scientifically derived from reported cases 
(such as Euclidean geometry). See Casebeer, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Coppage v. 
Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 765 (1985); Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Kennedy, Toward a 
Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in 
America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. (1980); Fineman & Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in 
THE POLITICS OF LA w, supra note 4, at 373; Gordon, Legal Thought and Practice in the Age of 
American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 
(G. Geison ed. 1983); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1985); 
Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465 (1988). Instead, our focus is 
on the underlying ideology, for which formalism was mainly the vocabulary of expression. For 
useful but different treatments of the topic, see G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LA w 
(1977); Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1983). 
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private actor did something irresponsible (nuisance, negligence, breach 
of consented-to arrangement, criminal behavior), the common law left 
her alone. Similarly, it went without saying for common law formal-
ists that the primacy of the private sphere was fair and good, in part 
because private interactions were fair means for allocating resources. 
Indeed, one role of law was to assure the integrity of these market 
mechanisms, by enforcing consented-to arrangements and nullifying 
efforts to interfere with such arrangements by labor unions, trusts, and 
governments. Finally, common law formalists believed that law is a 
neutral concomitant to the private market, and that law's own coer-
cion is necessary to maintain the ultimate freedom of American citi-
zens. Under this ideology there was little interest in government 
regulation, except as a "policing" mechanism to rectify exceptional 
market problems. 6 
One "exceptional" problem is disruption of private property rights, 
and common law formalists policed that with a vengeance. The ma-
jority opinion in Warshow is a strong signal that the state will protect 
property rights against trouble, and the opinion's reasoning follows 
the rigid, rule-like deductivism associated with formalism. An unspo-
ken premise of the opinion is the need to enforce trespass law strin-
gently. It categorically enumerates the "fundamental requirements" 
of the necessity defense, but with the warning that "if the qualifica-
tions for the defense of necessity are not closely delineated, the defini-
tion of criminal activity becomes uncertain and even whimsical."7 
One of the requirements, said the court, is that the danger sought to be 
avoided be imminent. The court found that "low-level radiation and 
nuclear waste are not the types of imminent danger classified as an 
emergency sufficient to justify criminal activity," because the court in-
ferred from the record that there was only a "possibility" of a nuclear 
disaster, and a possibility of statewide devastation is not enough. 8 
The formalist self-image, that of a logic-driven structure of rules 
protecting the status quo and settled property rights, is nicely reflected 
in Warshow, but so is the realist counterattack of the 1920s and 1930s. 
The realists rejected the bias toward the status quo and established 
interests that they saw in common law formalism. They saw the com-
6. See generally Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1276 (1984); Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. RE.v. 1189 (1986). 
The best then contemporary expression of this sort of ideology was E. FREUND, CASES ON Ao-
MINISTRATIVE LAW (1911). 
7. State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 24, 410 A.2d 1000, 1001 (1979). 
8. 138 Vt. at 25, 410 A.2d at 1002. According to the court: "To be imminent, a danger must 
be, or must reasonably appear to be, threatening to occur immediately, near at hand, and im· 
pending." 138 Vt. at 25, 410 A.2d at 1002. 
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mon law, not as a set of neutral rules, but as a set of policy-driven 
results, often failing to reflect the genuine needs of the community. 
Pursuing their critical agenda, the realists developed analytically pow-
erful arguments that could be used to debunk the claims of formalists 
and expose the ultimate policy grounds of their ostensibly rule-driven 
decisions. 
Given the overlap between the criminal law and tort defense of 
necessity, it is easy to imagine a realist critique of the Warshow major-
ity. The formal definition of the "imminence" requirement - that the 
danger sought to be avoided by the nuclear power protestors was "cer-
tain" rather than merely "possible" - was too narrow to carry out the 
full purposes of the necessity defense to subcategorize the criminal law 
to particular factual contexts. As the realist-inspired Learned Hand 
calculus for negligence suggested, a low probability of a grave harm 
was equivalent to a high probability of a minor harm. If a violation of 
trespass rules is to be privileged when a certain harm of small magni-
tude is involved - say the loss of the boat in Vincent v. Lake Erie -
then certainly it should also be privileged when there is a correspond-
ingly lower probability of pyramidically greater harm. In the context 
of Warshow, the greater harm was perhaps the kind of nuclear disaster 
that the world has since witnessed at Chernobyl. And in any event, 
the majority's invocation of "certainty" as a bright-line and categori-
cal inquiry reflected a premodernist world view. The line from a low 
possibility to a certainty was quantitative, not qualitative; "certainty" 
just referred to an extremely high probability of an event occurring. 
After all, even in the exemplar boat-docking cases from tort law upon 
which the majority relies, the harm to be avoided was the loss of boats 
at sea in a storm; to believe that beforehand one could know this result 
with certainty places more faith in the technology of weather and cas-
ualty prediction than most in the field profess. The language of 
weather forecasting and insurance is the language of probability. 
And, a realist might argue, the majority's invocation of a categori-
cal failure to show certainty in the offer of proof not only obscures an 
implicit policy balance that discounts the weight of the danger to be 
avoided; it also exaggerates the weight of the social interest in the tres-
pass laws that the criminal prohibition protects. As the majority ap-
plied the necessity defense, the weight of the public interest in the 
enforcement of criminal trespass laws was the same regardless of the 
context of the "violation." Trespass laws protect private property; the 
nuclear plant is not public property; therefore, the social interest in the 
protection of the security of private property applied. But one could 
object that this approach tends to treat all private property alike, re-
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gardless of its social context. There is, at least arguably, a different 
public interest in protecting private, intimate space (for example, the 
living room of one's house), than in protecting the sanctity of the 
grounds of the corporate complexes of huge economic enterprises (for 
example, the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant). On a continuum from 
private to public, the grounds of a nuclear power plant fall well be-
yond the core of private security invoked in the image of private prop-
erty and seem closer to the quasi-public nature of much of our social 
space. There was, accordingly, some reason to discount the private 
property interest in Warshow. Of course, this could be argued in the 
opposite direction. Given the sensitive and potentially devastating na-
ture of nuclear power mishaps, there is an even greater public interest 
in strictly enforcing trespass laws in this context: allowing control of 
operations to be dictated by activist disruption could be more devas-
tating to the societal interest in security than the core image of an 
invasion of an individual home implies. 
The realist point of the foregoing analysis is that the weight of the 
social interest in private property in the context of the movement to 
prevent the start-up of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant is 
debatable, and contingent upon a web of social, economic, and legal 
contexts. It is socially constructed - it cannot be determined by the 
simple invocation of the formal idea of the protection of private prop-
erty, since the degree to which "private property" necessarily means 
strict trespass enforcement will be the consequence of the judicial de-
termination, not its ground. There is no steady baseline dividing pub-
lic and private interests, contrary to the Warshow majority's formalist 
rhetoric. Choosing the appropriate weight to give "private property" 
in this particular case ultimately depended, not upon formally recog-
nizing where the case fit in a predetermined category, but instead upon 
making a political and social choice. That in turn depended heavily 
upon whether the judges believed that the power company and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and not the protesters, were the so-
cially responsible actors in this setting. One would either create a 
privilege on the part of the power company that could have disastrous 
consequences if the company is acting irresponsibly or create a privi-
lege for potentially dangerous citizen groups to disrupt nuclear power 
production. 
One possible implication of this kind of realist analysis was a 
thoroughgoing positivism: if law is the implicit balancing of social val-
ues with nothing objective to guide the procedure, it has no independ-
ent normative status; the lawmaking by courts just represents a fact 
about the world, to be observed, studied, and predicted. Yet another 
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version the positivist reaction took was to attempt to ground legiti-
mate lawmaking in the "facts" of social life, to view the policymaking 
implicit in the realist description as basically functional and technical 
rather than political and ideological. Two of the five justices rejected 
the form&list reasoning in Warshaw, implicitly adopting realist argu-
ments. Dissenting, Justice Billings argued that Warshow's proffer of 
evidence fully met the formal standards of the necessity defense, that 
the court majority was in reality deciding that Warshow's evidence 
was simply not credible, and that prior Vermont precedents had in 
similar circumstances required that the jury and not the judge decide 
such issues of credibility.9 Both he and concurring Justice Hill be-
lieved the issue in the case was really one of policy: "The defense of 
necessity proceeds from the appreciation that, as a matter of public 
policy, there are circumstances where the value protected by the law is 
eclipsed by a superseding value, and that it would be inappropriate 
and unjust to apply the usual criminal rule."10 
Justices Billings and Hill disagreed about the proper policy bal-
ance, and this was a central problem of realism. Their demonstration 
that legal rules do not control common law outcomes, coupled with 
their emphasis on policy balancing, suggested that the personal values 
of the decisionmakers (unelected judges) will be decisive, at least much 
of the time. This, in turn, created a practical distinction between the 
"is" and the "ought" that had been elided in common law formalism: 
The most that law can teach us, the realists said, is a description of 
how decisionmakers do behave; traditional legal study has little or no 
utility in teaching us how they ought to behave. The more skeptical 
realists left the impression that judge-made law is neither objective nor 
neutral. Given the indeterminacy of the issues in a case like Warshaw, 
the court's result has no legitimacy beyond the preference of four up-
per-middle class white males for the moneyed status quo (the nuclear 
plant). 
Justices Billings and Hill exemplify a postrealist generation that 
rejected the most positivist dimensions of realism; while they conceded 
that the substantive issue of whether to privilege the protestors' tres-
pass was inevitably a policy decision, they took as the critical focus of 
the case whether the balancing of values was already done democrati-
cally, through the federal and state structure of licensing and other 
forms of regulation applied to nuclear power. Rather than engage in 
the substantive debate over the safety of the Vepnont Yankee plant, 
9. 138 Vt. at 29-32, 410 A.2d at 1004-06 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
10. 138 Vt. at 27, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring); see 138 Vt. at 32, 410 A.2d at 1006 
(Billings, J., dissenting). 
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Justices Billings and Hill focused on the jurisdictional and procedural 
issues regarding whether to defer to other decisionmaking procedures. 
Many legal academics who in the 1930s agreed with the realists' 
rejection of common law formalism vigorously objected to the realists' 
delinking law from morality (the "is" from the "ought"). 11 Political 
theorists in the 1940s suggested a resolution to this debate: for the 
same reasons that moral philosophy has rejected closed deductive sys-
tems with demonstrably right answers (formalism, natural law) in 
favor of a relativistic view of knowledge and morality that prefers 
practical to theoretical solutions (functionalism, relativism), so polit-
ical philosophy should reject totalitarian, absolute values (fascism and 
communism) in favor of diversity of values and pluralism (democ-
racy).12 This move in political philosophy suggested that one reason 
democracy is superior to fascism is that it rests upon epistemologically 
sounder premises - its very openness to change enables it to perform 
better over time. Such a "relativist theory of democracy"13 had im-
portant implications for legal philosophy. This new conception facili-
tated the reconnection of law and morality, but in a less controversial 
way than common law formalism or natural law theories tried to do. 
The morality of law lay not in fundamental agreement about substan-
tive principles, but instead in the open structures and procedures of 
government, the process by which we can govern ourselves notwith-
standing disagreements. 14 This intellectual culture provided the con-
11. The realists' theories threatened law's legitimacy at a time when American intellectuals 
were frightened by the specter of fascism in Europe and needed reassurance that our democratic 
system embodied a "rule oflaw" missing in Nazi Germany. In 1940, two addresses by influential 
academics argued that realism was subversive of democracy, and that its ethical relativism 
(whatever is ordered by state decisionmakers is "law") paralleled that of Nazi Germany. See L. 
FULLER, supra note 2; R. POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY (1940). Note that 
Pound's own early work, see, e.g., Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COL UM. L. REV. 379 (1907); 
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908), was highly critical of 
common law formalism, and that Fuller's first big article, Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest 
in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937), was an exemplar piece of 
realist-inspired analysis. See generally E. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 117-58. 
12. See J. DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939); c. FRIEDRICH, THE NEW BELIEF IN 
THE COMMON MAN (1942); E. HERRING, THE PoLmcs OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN PARTIES 
IN ACTION (1940). 
13. E. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 197-217, discusses the movement in American political 
theory ''Toward a Relativist Theory of Democracy" in the 1940s and traces the ways in which 
such a theory was the basis for a conservative restructuring of American political thought in the 
1950s. Id. at 233-72. 
14. "[M]ay it not be that modern constitutional democracy is the endeavour precisely to 
organize government in such a way that disagreement on fundamentals need not be secured?" 
Friedrich, Democracy and Dissent, 10 POL. Q. 571, 573 (1939); see C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 12, 
at 181 ("what binds a free people together is not an agreement on fundamentals, but a common 
way of acting in spite of agreement on fundamentals"); E. HERRING, supra note 12, at 26 ("sig-
nificant thing is that the ideology of democracy permits the peaceful resolution of interest con-
flicts through accepted institutions"). 
February 1991] New Public Law 717 
text for the legal process ideology, underlying the concurring and 
dissenting opinions in Warshaw. 
The particular intellectual strategy chosen by the legal process 
thinkers was a brilliant synthetic rethinking of American public law. 15 
Table 1 crudely summarizes some of the moves made by legal process 
theory in relation to common law formalism and legal realism. We 
now examine the essential legal process concepts, namely, the purpo-
sive nature of law, the importance of interconnected institutions, and 
the legitimating role of process. We shall take as our text the Legal 
Process materials developed by Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert Sacks,16 
and apply it to the issues posed by our Case of the Nuclear Protesters. 
Common Law Formalism 
(1890s-1910s) 
Primacy of Private 
Domain over Public 
(Liberalism) 
Common Law Baselines 
as Starting Points for 
Analysis 
Rules & Categories 
Critical to Analysis 
(Formalism) 
TABLE 1 
Legal Realism 
(1920s-1930s) 
Primacy of Public over 
Private (Utilitarianism) 
Common Law Baselines 
Problematic; Expert 
Legislation and Agency 
Decisionmaking 
Empirical/Factual 
Analysis Critical; Policy 
Balancing (Functionalism) 
1. Law as Purposive 
Legal Process 
(1940s-1950s) 
Interaction of Public & 
Private (Purposivism) 
Governmental Regulation 
as Starting Point; 
Institutional Competence 
Process Critical 
(Proceduralism) 
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Warshaw both empha-
sized the policy purpose of the common law necessity exception.17 
This was a primary focus of Hart and Sacks, whose legal process 
materials grounded law's purposivism in a theory of society. "The 
starting point of the response which human beings seem invariably to 
make to the basic conditions of human existence is to recognize the 
fact of their interdependence with other human beings and the com-
munity of interest which grows out of it," posited Hart and Sacks. 
"So recognizing, people form themselves into groups for the protec-
15. Our discussion of the historical situatedness of legal process theory draws upon Eskridge 
& Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITI. L. 
REV. 691 (1987); Peller, supra note 4; Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and 
the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983); Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process 
Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987). 
16. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2. 
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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tion and advancement of their common interests .... " 18 The state is 
the "over-riding, general purpose group" created "to protect and fur-
ther the over-nding, basic interests which the members of a commu-
nity have in common."19 Given this role of the state, Hart and Sacks 
took a purposive view of law. Rejecting both the stingy view of law 
held by common law formalism and the cynical positivism of the legal 
realists, legal process viewed law as interconnected with society's col-
lective goals: "Law is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a 
continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living."20 
Hart and Sacks emphasized the role of statutes in modem public 
law, but of course viewed them as "purposive act[s]."21 For legal pro-
cess, moreover, enactment of a statute was merely the beginning, and 
not the end, of lawmaking.22 In the modem regulatory state, statutes 
are not just directives to citizens, but are directives to governmental 
officials charged with implementing the statutory scheme. Courts and 
agencies implement statutes through a process of "reasoned elabora-
tion. "23 Because "every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law 
developed by the decisional process has some kind of purpose or objec-
tive," the statute or doctrine can be applied to specific problems or 
controversies by a rational process in which the decisionmaker first 
identifies the purpose of the statute or doctrine and the "policy or 
principle" it embodies and then reasons toward the result most consis-
18. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 2. 
19. Id. Note how this story differs from the traditional liberal story of the state as a social 
contract among atomistic individuals seeking to avoid the brutish state of nature: the legal pro-
cess story emphasizes human beings' interrelatedness rather than their separateness and the posi· 
tive social benefits of cooperation rather than the simple need to resolve conflicts peacefully. See 
id. at 1 (emphasizing how "people are continuously and inescapably dependent upon one an· 
other" and their need for "knowledgeable cooperation"). 
20. Id. at 166. "Whatever particular objects may be sought by the various branches of our 
law, it is apparent on reflection that all of them are directed toward facilitating and improving 
men's coexistence and regulating with fairness and· equity the relations of their life in common." 
Fuller, Speluncean Explorers, supra note 2, at 621. The discussion of purposiveness is part of 
Hart and Sacks' broader discussion of law as a "science of society," which they contrasted to the 
objectivity possible in the science of nature. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 116-23. 
21. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 1156 ("The idea ofa statute without an intelligible 
purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible."). 
22. The "law" of a statute is not complete when the legislative stamp has been put upon 
it; subsequent judicial decisions add meaning and effect to the statutory direction. The in-
terpretation of a statute with respect to wholly unforeseen issues requires the exercise of 
originative thinking-On the part of those charged with its application to particular controver-
sies, whether these be judges or administrative officers. 
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv. 737, 761 (1940) (footnotes 
omitted). 
23. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 162-68 ("The Process of Reasoned Elaboration of 
Purportedly Determinate Directions") (emphasis omitted); id. at 168-71 ("The Reasoned Elabo· 
ration of Avowedly Indeterminate Directions") (emphasis omitted). 
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tent with that policy or principle.24 If the underlying policy appears 
ambiguous, "the official should interpret it in the way which best har-
monizes with more basic principles and policies oflaw."25 This is pre-
cisely what Justices Billings and Hill saw themselves doing - crafting 
the contours of necessity defense doctrine by reference to its overrid-
ing utilitarian purpose, and society's overall goal of self-preservation. 
2. Law as an Interconnected Institutional System 
(Institutional Competence) 
As a purposive system, law includes a number of "substantive un-
derstandings or arrangements" to govern the conduct of those living in 
the community.26 Yet Hart and Sacks emphasized the greater impor-
tance of the "constitutive or procedural understandings or arrange-
ments" by which the substantive arrangements are applied, 
interpreted, and changed.27 "These institutionalized procedures ... 
are obviously more fundamental than the substantive arrangements in 
the structure of a society, if not in the realization of its ultimate aims, 
since they are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and 
the indispensable means of making them work effectively."28 
If law is the channeling of the private sector to optimize productive 
collaboration in society, the question becomes how to tackle the com-
plex issues of a diverse and dynamic society.29 Drawing upon a cen-
tral tenet of the relativist theory of democracy, Hart and Sacks 
24. Id. at 166-67; see id. at 1179-203 (Hart & Sacks' purposive theory of statutory interpreta-
tion); Weisberg, supra note 15, at 233-36. 
25. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 165. The rationale underlying this suggestion is 
laid out in id. at 165-68. Note here the importance of policies and principles for legal process 
theory. As the state over time addresses social problems of cooperation and conflict, certain 
policies and principles become clear because of their practical importance in dealing with the 
issues. For legal process, law "rests upon a body of hard-won and deeply-embedded principles 
and policies." Id. at 101. The existence of underlying policies and principles gives law a seam-
less as well as dynamic quality. For agencies administering a vague statutory scheme, the under-
lying principles and policies provide direction for initial applications of the statute to specific 
problems, and then those applications together with the principles and policies narrow the range 
of agency discretion in future cases. For courts interpreting ambiguous statutes or precedents, 
their underlying principles and policies provide the necessary context to reach a reasoned deci-
sion, consistent with the broad canvass of law. Principles and policies form the basis for ex-
tending a rule or statute to a novel context, id. at 386-406, reformulating old rules or provisions, 
id. at 407-26, and even replacing prior rules or practices with new ones. Id. at 565-89. 
26. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
27. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
28. Id. "An organized society is one which has an interconnected system of procedures ade-
quate, or claiming to be adequate, to deal with every kind of question affecting the group's inter-
nal relations, and every kind of question affecting its external relations which the group can 
establish competence to deal with." Id. at 4. 
29. Id. at 180-83 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. 
L. REV. 489-91 (1954)). 
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endorsed the idea that broad dispersion of problem-solving is the most 
practical way to proceed. Because of the "boundless and unpredict-
able variety" of our dynamic society, legal process asserted that "pri-
vate ordering is the primary process of social adjustment."30 To the 
extent that private ordering does not solve the collective action prob-
lem, as in the case of nuclear energy, Hart and Sacks contemplated an 
interaction between private and public activity on the issue. The pub-
lic activity, in turn, tends to be somewhat dispersed and contemplates 
interaction between different institutions based upon their relative 
"competence" to handle the problem. Thus, the debate between Jus-
tices Hill (concurring in the court's affirmance of the trespass convic-
tion) and Billings (dissenting) in Warshaw was essentially over the 
competence of a common law court to set nuclear regulatory stan-
dards that might be different from those set by the Congress, the Ver-
mont legislature, and the federal and state regulators. 31 
Justices Hill and Billings were following, to the letter, the Hart and 
Sacks approach to the common law.32 Although Hart and Sacks ac-
cepted the conventional view of the common law as the "initial resort" 
for problems that cannot be solved by private activity, their treatment 
was concerned "as much with the shortcomings of the common law as 
a form of law as with its merits" and sought "to lay a foundation for 
an understanding of the frequent need for one of the more sophisti-
cated types of administered regulation or non-regulatory control."33 
More specifically, a recurring theme of legal process theory is whether 
a problem of collective action is better left to legislative, administra-
tive, or private solution. Thus, the Warshaw concurring opinion by 
Justice Hill argued that the common law defense of necessity "does 
not deal with non-imminent or debatable harms, nor does it deal with 
activities that the legislative branch has expressly sanctioned and 
found not to be harms."34 Justice Hill felt that the state and federal 
legislative approval of nuclear power generally had foreclosed judicial 
30. Id. at 183. Unlike the common law formalists, Hart and Sacks were not attempting to 
elevate the private sphere over the public sphere, as a normative matter. Instead, Hart and Sacks 
take the private sphere as a starting point for the functional reason that the number and variety 
of disputes in society can best be handled by initial resort to private resolution. See Peller, supra 
note 4, at 591-99. 
31. Compare Warshaw, 138 Vt. at 26-29, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring) with War-
shaw, 138 Vt. at 32-33, 410 A.2d at 1006 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
32. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, ch. 3 ("The Courts as Places of Initial 
Resort for Solving Problems Which Fail of Private Solution"). 
33. Id. at 366. 
34. Warshaw, 138 Vt. at 27, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring). Modern codifications of 
the necessity defense typically contain a provision carving out an exception to the necessity de-
fense where the legislature has plainly rejected the cost-benefit analysis put forward by the de-
fendant. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(l)(c) (tent. ed. 1958). 
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redetermination of the public danger issue. Justice Billings, in dissent, 
agreed that it would be inappropriate to privilege conduct if the legis-
lature had decided that the Vermont Yankee plant was safe, but 
sharply disputed that generalized legislative determinations of nuclear 
safety should reach situations in which the protesters asserted particu-
larized reasons to believe that a nuclear plant had specific safety 
defects.35 
3. The Importance of Process (Proceduralism) 
Procedure was critically important to the legal process vision. 
Again, this emphasis parallels attitudes held by defenders of the rela-
tivist theory of democracy. In a government of dispersed power and 
diverse views about substantive issues, "the substance of decision can-
not be planned in advance in the form of rules and standards," but 
"the procedure of decision commonly can be."36 Procedure is practi-
cally important in the Hart and Sacks materials for three reasons. 
First, procedure is an effective way to obtain good decisions.37 The 
procedures that ensure good legislative decisions, for example, are 
those suggested by the relativist theory of democracy - openness to 
the views of all affected persons and groups, focus on factual informa-
tion subjected to expert and critical scrutiny, and public deliberation 
through which the pros and cons are thoroughly discussed. 38 Second, 
procedure is the mearis by which the interconnected institutional sys-
tem works together effectively. Procedure not only defines the relative 
roles and duties of the different institutions (described above), but also 
provides mechanisms for systemic self-correction, an important virtue 
under the relativist theory of democracy.39 
35. 138 Vt. at 32, 410 A.2d at 1006 (Billjngs, J., dissenting). 
36. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 173. 
37. Hart and Sacks reasoned: "Experience is replete with proof of the vitally important rela-
tion between procedure and substance. A procedure which is soundly adapted to the type of 
power to be exercised is conducive to well-informed and wise decisions. An unsound procedure 
invites ill-informed and unwise ones." Id. 
38. Id. at 715-16 ("general agreement" that legislative process should be "informed," "delib-
erative," and "efficient"). The suggestion that "the best criterion of sound legislation is the test 
of whether it is the product of a sound process of enactment" epitomizes the legal process philos-
ophy. Id. at 715. The quotation in text is a rhetorical question in Hart and Sacks, to which they 
reply: "All will probably agree that procedure is a relevant consideration. There is less agree-
ment about the elements of a sound process." And then Hart and Sacks proceed to report "gen-
eral agreement" that legislation should be informed, deliberative, and efficient. Id. at 715-16. 
39. "Procedural safeguards, appropriately adapted, operate alike in the control of powers of 
reasoned elaboration, on the one hand, and of powers of continuing discretion, on the other." Id. 
at 173. For the administrative process, such safeguards include "the arrangements which pre-
scribe the procedure to be followed in exercising ... power: the information which must be 
secured; the people whose views must be listened to; the findings and justification of the decision 
which must be made; and the formal requisites of action which must be observed." Id. For the 
legislative process, the safeguards include the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
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Third, and most intimately related to the relativist theory of de-
mocracy, procedure is critical to law's legitimacy. One may debate the 
correctness of a legal decision or its popular support, but legal process 
posited that if the decision is the result of established procedures, that 
alone lends it some degree of legitimacy. Consider Hart and Sacks' 
famed "principle of institutional settlement." 
Implicit in every such system of procedures is the central idea of law 
- an idea which can be described as the principle of institutional settle-
ment . ... The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the estab-
lishment of regularized and peaceable methods of decision. The 
principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that deci-
sions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures 
[for making decisions] of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon 
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed . 
. . . When the principle of institutional settlement is plainly applica-
ble, we say that the law "is" thus and so, and brush aside further discus-
sion of what quote "ought" to be. Yet the "is" is not really an "is" but a 
special kind of "ought" - a statement that, for the reasons just re-
viewed, a decision which is the duly arrived at result of a duly estab-
lished procedure for making decisions of that kind "ought" to be 
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until it has been 
duly changed.40 
Compare the Hart and Sacks principle with this key passage from the 
Warshaw concurring opinion: 
Implicit within these statutory enactments is the policy choice that the 
benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its dangers. 
If we were to allow defendants to present the necessity defense in this 
case we would, in effect, be allowing a jury to redetermine questions of 
policy already decided by the legislative branches of the federal and state 
governments. This is not how our system of government was meant to 
operate.41 
The principle of institutional settlement expressed in Hart and 
Sacks, and parrotted in Justice Hill's concurrence, provides a sum-
marizing concept for the legal process philosophy. Legal process 
thinkers (Hart and Sacks) and judges (Justice Hill) could avoid taking 
positions on "questions of policy" and yet avoid sounding like min-
dless positivists. The principle of institutional settlement permitted 
judges and scholars to discuss law in normative terms - such-and-
such a policy "should" be followed, because it has been "arrived at as 
presentment, as well as the rules and safeguards adopted voluntarily by Congress, and the "ulti-
mate check" of the ballot box. Id. at 172-73, 178-79. For the judicial process, the safeguards 
include the due process guarantees of notice, a meaningful right to be heard by an impartial 
decisionmaker, and the right to appellate review. 
40. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original). 
41. State v. Warshaw, 138 Vt. 22, 28, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (1979) (Hill, J., concurring). 
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a result of duly established procedures." The normativity of law rests 
in its process, and not in its substance. As we shall now see, however, 
legal process' proceduralism was itself subject to different ideological 
interpretations, and almost immediately in history dissolved into com-
peting normative visions. 
B. The Ambiguous Legacy of Legal Process Theory and Attacks 
from Left and Right 
The legal process synthesis was a brilliant achievement, for it tran-
scended the realist/formalist debate in a way that fit well with the 
relativist theory of democracy. The scholars were able to marginalize 
Lochner-style constitutional law as impermissible value-imposition by 
unelected judges, while simultaneously moving mainstream American 
jurisprudence into the modem era by acknowledging and legitimating 
the inescapably political character of the common law, statutory inter-
pretation, and administrative law. In short, legal process asserted the 
illegitimacy of activist judicial review while asserting activism in virtu-
ally all other institutional settings. You could get rid of Lochner but 
still have McPherson v. Buick and the Federal Trade Commission. 
That achievement also bespoke an ambiguous legacy of legal pro-
cess theory, an ambiguity that became clear in the 1960s and 1970s in 
cases such as Warshow. On the one hand, the proceduralism and insti-
tutional competence themes of legal process theory were potentially 
quite conservative. For example, the principle of institutional settle-
ment is not only the apotheosis of legal process' proceduralism, but 
also of its status quo orientation. It reintegrated law and morality in a 
way that privileges the status quo, since the fairness or justice of ex-
isting rules and arrangements requires no continuing defense under 
the legal process philosophy.42 Once the "duly established" mecha-
nisms of government have spoken on a legal issue, its resolution is the 
normatively "right" answer until that resolution is altered through the 
duly established (statist) procedures. Mainstream process theory, rep-
resented by such eminent scholars as Alexander Bickel, Paul Bator, 
Harry Wellington, and Robert Bork, assiduously developed these for-
malist, conservative themes in constitutional law and federal jurisdic-
tion after the 1950s. 
Justice Hill's concurring opinion in Warshow emphasizes the con-
servative, status quo features of legal process theory. While recogniz-
ing that the necessity defense implicated important public policy 
concerns, he avoided any opinion on the merits by deferring to the 
42. See Peller, supra note 5. 
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"deliberate legislative choice as to the values at issue. "43 By establish-
ing administrative "mechanisms for the regulation of nuclear power," 
Justice Hill reasoned that the legislature had implicitly determined 
that the benefits of nuclear power always outweigh the costs.44 "I ex-
press no opinion as to the relative merits or demerits of nuclear en-
ergy, nor do I question the sincerity of defendants' beliefs. All that I 
would hold is that this Court is not the proper forum to grant defen-
dants the relief they seek. "45 
On the other hand, emphasis on institutional competence and 
proceduralism, if carried too far, might undermine the very idea that 
leads off the Hart and Sacks materials - the purposiveness of law as a 
way to facilitate our social interdependence. Thus a rigid adherence to 
procedures and deference to institutional competence were not defen-
sible, even under the legal process philosophy, if the procedures were 
faulty and the institutions not as competent as we might have thought. 
It would be mere formalism of an institutional variety if one deferred 
to a decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a case like 
Warshaw just because the decision emanated from that agency; if the 
purpose of creating the agency was to preserve the reasonable safety of 
the public, that agency's entitlement to deference depends on the as-
sumption that its decisions reflect this public policy - the very issue 
the protestors contest. Substantive and procedural issues were indis-
tinguishable since one way we might recognize faulty procedures and 
incompetent institutions is by their tendency to produce dumb results. 
Although legal process theory in the 1950s had developed in part to 
avoid lawtalk about substantive results, progressive process scholars in 
the 1970s, such as Charles Black, Owen Fiss, John Hart Ely, and 
Frank Michelman, found it impossible to remain true to legal process' 
purposivism without keeping one eye on substance. 
In this vein, the concurrence and dissent reflect the alternatives of 
a formalist or purposive identification of institutional legitimacy from 
within the legal process analytic. Justice Hill was willing to defer to a 
"democratic" decision based simply on the fact of legislative delega-
tion of safety to regulatory agencies, but Justice Billings' dissenting 
43. Warshow, 138 Vt. at 27, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring). 
44. 138 Vt. at 27, 410 A.2d at 1003. Justice Hill chided Justice Billings for questioning the 
efficacy of the statutory scheme: 
The legislative framework was set up to deal with the very situation defendants offered to 
prove "might" happen. But because neither the state legislature nor Congress acted to shut 
down the power plant based upon speculative possibilities does not, in my opinion, give rise 
to the questionable inference that there was an emergency which the regulatory scheme 
failed to avert. 
138 Vt. at 28, 410 A.2d at 1004. 
45. 138 Vt. at 28, 410 A.2d at 1003. 
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opinion in Warshow rejected the concurrence's effort "~o hide behind 
inferences that the legislature precluded the courts from hearing the 
defense of necessity in the instant case."46 For one thing, Justice Bill-
ings questioned the appropriateness of deference to a legislative judg-
ment "where, as here, the defendants offer to prove an emergency 
which the regulatory scheme failed to avert."47 For another thing, he 
disputed Justice Hill's "implication" that the legislature intended to 
halt common law development when it adopted the statutory scheme. 
Citing general statutory admonitions to develop popular awareness of 
nuclear safety concerns and a private cause of action for individuals 
harmed by nuclear radiation, Justice Billings argued that the statutory 
scheme was open-ended on the issue in suit.48 
The tension between the formalist and purposivist themes within 
legal process was soon exploited by critics from both the right and the 
left. On the right is the Chicago School law-and-economics move-
ment, which takes as its starting point the legitimacy of our pluralist 
political system and the socioeconomic status quo and focuses on the 
comprehensive efficiency of different legal rules.49 Law and economics 
has broadened intellectual discourse in law, exposing the question-beg-
ging features of both traditional and process approaches. A law-and-
economics approach to Warshow, for example, would be less interested 
in the elements of the necessity defense (formalism) and the proper 
institution to determine nuclear risks (process theory), and more inter-
ested in the unqerlying structural issues. A major issue would be: 
looking at the general problem ex ante, what legal rule yields the in-
centives for environmentalists (alerting us to potential dangers), for 
regulators (who may be subject to rent-seeking pressure), and for the 
managers of the nuclear reactor that will result in an efficient alloca-
tion of resources to preventing disasters? For Richard Posner and 
other law-and-economics scholars of the 1960s and 1970s, legal pro-
cess theory was not asking relevant questions and offered no rigorous 
methodology for making significant policy judgments such as the one 
presented in Warshow. 
On the left, CLS scholars criticized process ideology for its ten-
46. 138 Vt. at 32, 410 A.2d at 1006 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
47. 138 Vt. at 32, 410 A.2d at 1006. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text for our 
analysis of the circularity always possible in legal process analytics. 
48. 138 Vt. at 32-33, 410 A.2d at 1006. 
49. In this article, we shall mainly discuss Chicago School law and economics, which takes as 
its starting point the assumed legitimacy of status quo institutions and allocations of power. 
Early classics include G. CALABRESI, THE Cosr OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); R. POSNER, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972). See also R. POSNER, 
THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). 
726 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:707 
dency to depoliticize social issues by channeling inquiry into proce-
dural discourse and challenged the normative prong of process theory 
by arguing that the ethical bases for deference under the principle of 
institutional settlement were just as controversial as substantive deci-
sionmaking and in any event they were analytically inseparable. As 
CLS described process theory, it reflected a particular status quo 
slanted ideology (the deference to "duly established procedures") for 
legitimating as neutral and rational basic social conditions of Ameri-
can life. Process theorists lacked a critical basis on which to distin-
guish legitimate from illegitimate institutional decisionmaking. 
Notwithstanding its claims toward neutral principles and results, legal 
process theory is no better than common law formalism at yielding 
determinate results based upon democratically made decisions. A crit-
ical approach to Justice Hill's Warshaw concurrence would argue that 
the decisions made by democratic majorities do not support Justice 
Hill's deference to the regulatory safety rules. Even under legal pro-
cess assumptions, Justice Hill's result does not necessarily follow, be-
cause there was no indication that the legislature expected (1) the 
regulatory regime entirely to preempt the common law defense of ne-
cessity, (2) the regulatory regime to foreclose alternatives in the case of 
emergency, or (3) anyone to defer to the regulatory regime if it broke 
down. On the whole, there is even a countermajoritarian tone to the 
Warshaw concurrence: by taking the case away from the jury, the ju-
diciary removed this public issue from the only "representative" body 
that was available, in deference to a legislative intent made up by a 
bunch of unelected judges. 
CLS and law and economics were powerful alternative visions to 
public law issues. The reaction of mainstream academics has been am-
bivalent. Most have rejected what appeared to them "extremist" or 
"ideologically charged" movements on the right and the left.50 Yet 
some mainstream scholars have recognized the problems with tradi-
tional legal process theory suggested by law and economics and CLS 
and have sought to reinterpret the legal process tradition in light of 
these criticisms, and in light of new learning in political theory, his-
tory, and philosophy. 
C. The ''New" Legal Process Agenda for Public Law 
The Hart and Sacks legal process materials continue to define the 
pedagogical and intellectual agenda for most American public law 
50. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note l; Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
1 (198{>). 
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around law's purposivism, institutional relationships, and proper pro-
cedures. 51 Hence, it may be more appropriate to talk about "new legal 
process"52 than about any truly "New Public Law." Even if that is so, 
public law discourse in the 1970s and 1980s was not just a rehashing of 
Hart and Sacks. Instead, it refined and developed their themes in re-
sponse to new problems, to new theories and information, and to the 
attacks of law and economics and CLS. Indeed, recent public law 
scholarship is characterized by a tendency to engage with extralegal 
sources and other academic disciplines. Hence, public law scholarship 
in the 1980s has drawn extensively from extralegal work in civic re-
publicanism, 53 theology, 54 feminism, 55 hermeneutics, 56 pragmatism, 57 
and public choice theory.ss 
The relationship between legal process theory and these extralegal 
theories is complex. The wider intellectual compass provided by these 
51. Although the Hart and Sacks materials were never published, they have spawned a gen-
eration of important cases and materials books that approach subjects from a comprehensive 
institutional process perspective. Consider not only books on civil procedure, e.g., R. FIELD & 
B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC CoURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1953) (a classic now in its 
sixth edition, with Kevin Clermont as coauthor), administrative law, e.g., R. CASS & C. DIVER, 
ADMINISfRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1987); S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (1979); J. MAsHAW 
& R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1975), and legislation, e.g., w. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988), but also books on 
what might have been considered more "substantive" fields. E.g., T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MAR-
TIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY (1985); J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. 
CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE (1984); R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1981). 
52. See Weisberg, supra note 15; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15, at 693; McDougall, 
Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 
75 CORNELL L. REv. 83 (1989); Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process (Book 
Review), 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1989). 
53. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 
1539 (1988). 
54. See Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985 (1990); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -
Foreword: Nomos and Na"ative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
55. See c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Minow, The 
Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987); 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1921-36 (1987). 
56. See INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S. Levinson & 
S. Mailloux eds. 1988); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 35-275 (1985); Es-
kridge, Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990). 
57. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); Symposium on the Renais-
sance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Farber, Legal 
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Patterson, Law'.s Pragmatism: 
Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REv. 937 (1990). 
58. See D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUC-
TION (1991); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). 
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theories has lent legal process analysis more critical bite, somewhat 
greater concern about substantive justice, and an intellectual vocabu-
lary for liberal process theorists to develop their arguments for pro-
gressive coherence and purposivist law. As this description suggests, 
progressive rather than conservative scholars have been quick to util-
ize these particular extralegal theories, and these scholars are often 
ones who are more sympathetic to CLS than to law and economics. 
Yet they try to remain faithful to the legal process agenda for public 
law scholarship and, more significantly, have deployed extralegal theo-
ries in a legal processy way. Paralleling the old legal process emphasis 
on purposive law, proceduralism, and institutional competence, new 
legal process scholarship emphasizes the dynamics of purposive law 
(republicanism, hermeneutics), public deliberation (republicanism) 
and its structural features or biases (public choice theory), and a dia-
logic approach to truth (feminism, hermeneutics, pragmatism). The 
agenda is still recognizably legal process, but with a distinct emphasis 
on its progressive features and on arguments drawn from these extrale-
gal theories. 
1. The Dynamics of Purposive Law 
Hart and Sacks reconceptualized law as dynamic. Thus, judges 
adapt and rethink common law categories when they apply them to 
new problems and social settings; statutory meaning evolves over time 
as judges and agencies implement and interpret the statutes; and the 
interaction of private parties, the legislature, courts, and agencies 
keeps the law in a constant state of flux. Reflecting the views of subse-
quent conservative process thinkers, Justice Hill's concurring opinion 
in Warshow emphasized that legal dynamics must be effected slowly 
and deliberately by the elected branches of government. Justice Bill-
ings' dissenting opinion reflected a more progressive process perspec-
tive, boldly rethinking a regulatory problem based upon new 
information and the challenge of the case. New legal process scholar-
ship has more systematically pursued the dissent's purposive ap-
proach. Consider the following sampler: 
a. Dynamic statutory interpretation. Legal process theory argued 
that judges should interpret statutes by choosing the interpretation 
most consonant with the statutes' purposes. 59 This approach is an in-
herently dynamic alternative to one based upon the legislature's origi-
59. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 166-67, 1179-203; see also Frankfurter, supra note 
2; Radin, supra note 55. More recent elaborations include J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 
(1982); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); S. 
MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 255-70 (2d ed. 1982). 
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nal intent: because society, law, and the nature of the problem change 
over time, effecting the statute's purpose might lead to statutory devel-
opments not contemplated or even rejected by the statutory drafters. 
Although Hart and Sacks contemplated this possibility,60 their more 
conservative followers were disturbed by the countermajoritarian na-
ture of judicial "amendment" of commands enacted by the legislature. 
The 1980s witnessed a strong revival of theories of "dynamic statutory 
interpretation. "61 
The arguments for dynamic statutory interpretation include the 
traditional legal process arguments, focusing on the institutional com-
petence of courts to update statutes. 62 But unlike Hart and Sacks, 
newer legal process writers rest the case for dynamic statutory inter-
pretation upon broader theories of meaning and politics.63 Like bibli-
cal, literary, and aesthetic interpretation, statutory interpretation is an 
interaction between a past text and a present interpreter; that interac-
tion yields meaning that changes over time. The political legitimacy of 
dynamic, as opposed to static, statutory meaning is supported by argu-
ments from civic republicanism and public choice theory. !flaw's le-
gitimacy rests upon its ability to serve the common good 
(republicanism) and if the legislative process does not systematically 
update statutes in a satisfactory way (public choice), then it is the re-
sponsibility of statutory interpreters to apply old statutes to new 
problems creatively - and dynamically. 
One consequence of the new focus has been a renewed emphasis on 
what is in fact the "best" or most sound policy result. 64 Consistent 
with but going beyond the dissenting opinion in Warshaw, dynamic 
theory in the 1980s would argue that regulatory statutes should be 
interpreted with an understanding of the new learning about grave 
risks posed by nuclear power, risks that were apparently underap-
60. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 1203-15 (the women jurors cases). 
61. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); 
Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian 
Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137 (1990); Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory In-
terpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Patterson, Interpretation 
in Law: Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REv. 671 (1984); Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989). 
62. Eskridge, supra note 61, at 1523-29, 1533-38; see G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR 
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (boldly arguing that courts ought to be able to overrule obsoles-
cent statutes the same way they overrule obsolescent judicial precedents). 
63. See Eskridge, supra note 61, at 1506-11 (hermeneutics); id. at 1513-16 (republicanism); 
id. at 1516·23 (public choice). 
64. See Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Eskridge, 
Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory 
Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989). 
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preciated when the statutes were adopted and that the political process 
has been slow to correct (for public choice reasons). Although the 
concurring opinion may have been closer to the original understanding 
of the statute, to occupy the entire field of nuclear safety, the dissent-
ing opinion's interpretation of the statute to allow citizens to protect 
themselves is a better interpretation, for substantive policy reasons. 65 
b. Implementation over time of intransitive statutes. Hart and 
Sacks recognized that different statutes entail different dynamics. For 
example, statutes setting forth detailed duties for private citizens work 
out very differently from statutes setting forth highly general directives 
to agencies to implement.66 Legal process theory in the 1950s focused 
mostly on transitive statutes whose directives are addressed directly to 
the citizenry, but recent scholarship explores the interesting ways in 
which intransitive statutes (mainly, those addressed to agencies) 
evolve. 67 A substantial literature explores the related question of 
court-agency dynamics: how much deference should a court give to 
an agency interpretation of its intransitive statute? The prevailing ap-
proach today by both courts and commentators elaborates upon the 
traditional legal process position of deference to agencies, 68 which was 
also a working assumption of the Warshow concurrence. 
65. Yet we regret the dissent's weak reasoning. For example, the dissent invokes the musty 
canon that, absent a clear legislative statement, statutes should not be interpreted to change the 
common law. State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 32-33, 410 A.2d 1000, 1006 (1979) (Billings, J., 
dissenting). This canon has been largely discredited in the era of the regulatory state and in our 
view has malign social consequences in its preservation of outmoded common law baselines. 
Other statutory provisions invoked by the dissent are simply not on point and do not even convey 
a general policy flavor supporting the dissent. We do agree with the dissent that there is no 
necessary implication from the statutory scheme that the common law cannot be left free to 
evolve. 
66. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 188-89; see also id. at 169-71. We should note 
that these materials pay much less attention to the administrative process than the judicial, legis-
lative, or executive process, which the editors regretted. Id. at 1092. 
67. The transitive/intransitive distinction originates with Rubin, Law and Legislation in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989). A more recent article expanding this dis-
tinction is Strauss, Relational Readers of Intransitive Statutes: Agency Interpretation and the 
Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming). 
68. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[T]he court does 
not simply impose its own construction on [an intransitive statute] .••. Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.") (footnotes omitted); H. 
HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 1417 ("An interpretation by an administrative agency 
charged with first-line responsibility for the authoritative application of the statute should be 
accepted by the Court as conclusive, if it is consistent with the purpose properly to be attributed 
to the statute, and if it has been arrived at with regard to the factors which should be taken into 
account in elaborating it."). The leading legal process defense of judicial deference to agencies is 
found in Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 
(1985). For a critique, see Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad· 
ministrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (arguing that judicial deference to agencies 
allows power to be skewed in favor of the executive branch). 
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Most new legal process scholarship has shown a skeptical ap-
proach to agencies more consistent with the Warshow dissent than 
with the concurrence. Public choice theory, for example, suggests sys-
tematic dysfunctions in agency policymaking that undermine recent 
scholars' willingness to give agencies blanket deference. 69 Scholars 
criticize judicial deference to agency decisions as an abdication of judi-
cial responsibility to reason and good policy. 70 
c. Law as dynamic coherence. Given Hart and Sacks' assump-
tions about interdependence and the importance attributed to princi-
ples and policies in law, legal process thinkers naturally emphasized 
coherence arguments. Law should seek consistency, and a legal argu-
ment on an unsettled issue is strengthened by its coherence with ex-
isting law. Thus, "[d]oubts about the purposes of particular statutes 
... must be resolved, if possible, so as to harmonize them with more 
general principles and policies" of law.71 
There are some striking similarities between the legal process syn-
thesis of the 1950s and Ronald Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity," 
which posits that a judge interpreting a statute, the Constitution, or a 
common law decision has a duty to render an interpretation that best 
"fits" the text and overall principles of law. 72 Dworkin's theory relies 
on the legal process distinction between "policies" and "principles" 
and on the importance of coherence arguments in law. The close link 
between Dworkin's theory and the legal process synthesis may help 
explain Dworkin's prominence, for his work explores the classic legal 
process themes through a more systematic analytical philosophy. Yet, 
Dworkin's work is not ''just" legal process, for it is self-consciously 
evaluative. The judge must make the legal text the "best it can be," 
and Dworkin realizes that this means the judge must be a substantive 
critic as well as a process synthesizer. 
69. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 
(1975). 
70. See Farina, supra note 68. 
71. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2, at 167. Hart and Sacks state: 
The court's last resort, when doubt about the immediate purpose of a statute remains, is 
resort to an appropriate presumption drawn from some general policy of the law. 
This is likely to be its only resort when the question concerns more nearly ultimate 
policy, or the mode of fitting the statute into the general fabric of the law. 
Id. at 1416; see also id. at 1413 (policy of clear statement "forbids a court to.understand a legisla-
ture as directing a departure from a generally prevailing principle or policy of the law unless it 
does so clearly"). 
72. "Law as integrity" is developed in R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Wellman, 
supra note 15, has argued in detail that Dworkin's work before Law'.!' Empire (especially R. 
DWORKIN, The Model of Rules (I & II), in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-80 (1977)) is very 
similar, if not identical, to H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 2. Note here that Dworkin gradu-
ated from the Harvard Law School in 1957, at the apogee of legal process' formative period. 
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One limitation of legal process theory was its underappreciation of 
structural biases in the political system. Feminism and critical race 
theory have highlighted the attitudinal biases of traditional lawmak-
ing, and public choice theory suggests the nature of some institutional 
dysfunctions. Republicanism insists that government be structured to 
nurture and respond to public values. As the dissenting opinion in 
Warshow makes clear, however, a concern with institutional and pro-
cedural biases is consistent with a progressive legal process approach 
that insists that government subserve the purposes it holds out to the 
citizenry. An important goal of the new legal process is to think about 
structural solutions and "adopt new strategies for achieving national 
goals in lieu of the centralizing command and control techniques" of 
the New Deal.73 The structural solutions usually involve the applica-
tion of the checks and balances concept. 74 Consider the following 
examples. 
a. New checks on bureaucratic decisionmaking. Just as dysfunc-
tions in private ordering call forth regulation, usually by agencies, so 
should regulation be devised to deal with dysfunctions in public order-
ing. Here, legislatures or agencies are often the culprits, and progres-
sive legal process scholars have advocated novel solutions. One might 
read the dissenting opinion in Warshow this way: because there was 
tangible reason to believe that the nuclear regulatory agencies were not 
vigilant!~ protecting the public's safety, the court should have been 
open to the evidence of citizens monitoring the safety of the reactor. 
Trial of the necessity defense should have been allowed to ventilate 
this issue, especially given the potentially enormous public risks. 
A similar theme informs scholarship about the "structural injunc-
tion, "75 which responds to the perceived need for judges to enter in-
creasingly detailed orders in school desegregation cases, because the 
political process (for structural reasons) was unwilling to make serious 
movement to the unitary school system mandated by Brown v. Board 
of Education. 76 Similarly, new legal process scholars agree that more 
aggressive judicial review might ameliorate the systemic biases of 
73. Stewart, Mailison's Nightmare, 51 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 335, 352 (1990). 
74. See, e.g., Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and 
Administrative Government, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1990). 
75. See 0. Flss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); R. COVER, o. Flss & J. RESNIK, 
PROCEDURE 227-351 (1989) (case study of desegregation injunction); Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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agencies, 77 as well a8 tackle some of the problems of administrative 
inaction. 78 Perhaps more important has been the administrative law 
scholarship advocating a stronger role for executive or legislative re-
view of agency decisions, as a better way to correct regulatory 
misfires. 79 
b. Regulatory strategies. Hart and Sacks were interested in alter-
native strategies for regulating collective action problems, through pri-
vate groups or administrative agencies or citizen lawsuits or some mix, 
but they tended to ignore issues of comparative regulatory strategies 
- the advantages and disadvantages of different strategies for different 
problems. The various opinions in Warshow are representative of this 
blind spot; even the dissenting opinion views regulation along the 
fairly simple lines of agency rulemaking and citizen enforcement. An 
important theme of new legal process scholarship considers the rich 
menu of regulatory strategies from which to choose and the relative fit 
between social problem and regulatory strategy. 
Recent scholarship focusing on regulatory failure argues that the 
biggest problem of regulation is that regulatory weapons are not well-
suited to dealing with the problems attacked. 80 Different justifications 
for regulation (market failure versus social justice, for example) will 
usually require different regulatory strategies (antitrust and disclosure 
rules versus distributive laws in our example). A major problem for 
the regulatory state is matching justifications for regulation with strat-
egies. Another chall.enge is approaching each regulatory strategy 
more critically, to determine whether or not it works and whether or 
not its costs outweigh its benefits. 
c. Reinvigorating the political process. Although the legitimacy of 
legal process theory rested in part upon the assumption that America 
enjoys a working democracy, legal process thinkers were not very curi-
ous about the political system in this country. As an example, none of 
the opinions in Warshow reveals the slightest doubt that we have a 
well-functioning democracy, in which the legislature legitimately rep-
resents and is responsive to the will of the people. Even the dissenting 
77. The seminal piece is Stewart, supra note 69 .. 
78. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. Cr. REv. 177; Sun-
stein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Hechler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1985). 
79. See Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979); 
Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975); Strauss & 
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181 
(1986). 
80. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Fail-
ure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979). A 
similar theme is pursued in c. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). 
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opinion, which alludes with vague approval to the defendant's argu-
ment that "although there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme, it 
had failed,"81 neglects to pursue its own suggestion. Strikingly, the 
dissent fails to note the irony that the majority opinion snatches the 
Warshaw necessity defense away from the jury, "We the People," 
based upon antiquarian doctrine made up by unelected judges! 
Recent intellectual developments in public law scholarship suggest 
that greater emphasis should be placed on the operation of the polit-
ical system: civic republicanism values a politically aware and in-
volved citizenry; feminism and critical race theory question the 
legitimacy of what were once thought to be "majoritarian" decisions; 
and public choice theory challenges the accepted conventions of "ma-
jority rule." Thus far, new legal process scholarship has been notably 
slow in pursuing these themes, although new legal process scholarship 
is emerging around issues of campaign finance, 82 bribery and legisla-
tive ethics, 83 direct democracy, 84 and the role of local government in a 
federal republic. 85 
3. Judicial Review as Moral or Political Dialogue 
Although legal process theory contemplated substantial judicial 
lawmaking through creative statutory interpretation, it considered 
such lawmaking necessarily "interstitial." Consistent with the relativ-
ist theory of democracy, legal process theory recognized that a 
"counter-majoritarian difficulty" inhered in any judicial invalidation 
of legislative or administrative rules. 86 The legal process assumption 
that courts would not often invalidate the work product of the 
majoritarian political branches was arguably contrary, however, to the 
judicial activism of the 1960s and 1970s. From this apparent inconsis-
tency sprung a substantial literature justifying or criticizing activist 
judicial review along legal process lines. 
This challenge has been most acute in connection with Brown v. 
Board of Education. 87 The legal process synthesis was almost com-
81. Warshow, 138 Vt. at 32, 410 A.2d at 1006 (Billings, J., dissenting). 
82. See Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom 
of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273 (1983); see generally W. 
EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 51, at 209-39. 
83. See Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intennediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. 
REV. 784 (1985); see generally W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 51, at 164-209. 
84. See W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 51, at 520-59. 
85. See Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 16 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990). 
86. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). 
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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pletely oblivious to the role of constitutional law in ending apartheid 
in the United States. The most important legal process thinker to ad-
dress Brown in the 1950s (Herbert Wechsler) confessed that he could 
find no "neutral principle" to justify the result.88 Wechsler's immedi-
ately famous neutral principles article faithfully expressed the legal 
process consensus in constitutional law (repudiation of Lochner and 
judicial value-imposition), but, by questioning a decision that seemed 
so unquestionably right, the article cast a pall over the entire legal 
process enterprise, because it revealed its conservative underside. 
Legal process thought could not avoid the Brown issue in the 
1960s, but it could never quite explain Brown, except as a case 
uniquely compelled by unusual circumstances. 89 Much of the 
"newer" legal process work in the 1970s and 1980s was directly or 
indirectly aimed at this very problem. 
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust was the first impressive 
defense of Brown through the perspective of legal process theory.90 
His "representation-reinforcement" theory accepted the counter-
majoritarian difficulty as the central problem of judicial review, espe-
cially when the Court invalidates legislation based upon the "open-
textured" provisions of the Constitution such as the equal protection 
clause.91 The Court can escape this difficulty by a reasoned elabora-
tion of those provisions based upon principles derived from the Consti-
tution and its underlying structure.92 That structure is proceduralist, 
and the role of the Court is to protect the integrity of the political 
process. 93 The Court is a "perfecter of democracy" and, hence, is jus-
tified in striking down laws that cut off the channels of political change 
(voting restrictions), that seek to limit dissent (prior restraints, repres-
sion of unpopular stands),94 or that penalize a "discrete and insular 
minority" which has been systematically excluded from the political 
process (as in the Brown cases).95 
88. See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34 (admitting that he "like[d]" the result in Brown but 
believed that some neutral principle for the result had to be found to render it legitimate). See 
generally Peller, supra note 4. 
89. See A. BICKEL, supra note 86. 
90. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); see also 
J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). 
91. ELY, supra note 90, at 1-9. 
92. Id. at 88-104. 
93. This is a classic legal process idea, expressed most clearly in the "due process oflawmak-
ing" literature. "[T]he central function of judicial review" should be "to guarantee the demo-
cratic legitimacy of political decisions by establishing the essential rules of the political process." 
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 251 (1976); see W. EsKRIDGE & P. 
FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 340-67 (elaborating on this line of constitutional writing). 
94. ELY, supra note 90, at 105-34. 
95. Id. at 75-77, 135-79. 
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Representation reinforcement is in some ways the apotheosis of 
legal process theory, at least as applied to constitutional issues. Even 
as Ely's approach has become mainstream, its vulnerability to the 
same formalist/purposive analytic has been apparent. One could iden-
tify the legitimating procedures for democratic decisionmaking in for-
malist fashion, by simply seeing if people have voted for governmental 
officials. Or one could ask in purposive fashion if the quality of life 
and power relations in American society is characterized by the kind 
of freedom that makes self-determination attractive and possible. The 
process-inspired move to representation-reinforcement cannot escape 
substantive value choices since they are implicated in the image of 
democratic representation itself. Scholarly commentary has thus 
tended to focus on the proceduralist impulse behind Ely's synthesis. 
The Constitution is not just a proceduralist document;96 indeed its 
central point, representative democracy, is a value choice. Reading 
substantive values out of the Constitution is something like reading 
God out of the Bible. Even if the Constitution were essentially a 
proceduralist document, nothing in it suggests that courts ought to use 
process arguments to invalidate legislation.97 And even if the Court 
were truly the "perfecter of democracy," neither it nor Ely has a co-
herent or informed theory of democracy that provides useful guide-
lines regarding when intervention is justified.98 
Given the difficulties with Ely's synthesis, the past ten years have 
seen a proliferation of theories of judicial review premised upon the 
idea that constitutional "[a]djudication is the social process by which 
judges give meaning to our public values."99 Most of these theories of 
96. The heart of Ely's book is its elegant demonstration that some of the apparently substan· 
tive protections of the Constitution - such as the establishment clause and the anti-self-incrimi· 
nation clause - are just as much procedural provisions as substantive ones. Yet the same 
demonstration could be made for most of the procedural provisions. For example, the free 
speech clause protects individual dignity and privacy interests (recall Griswold), as well as some 
market interests (recall Goldfarb and Bigelow), and so cannot be viewed as just protecting access 
to the political process. All that Ely's elegant demonstrations really suggest is the incoherence 
between the substance-procedure distinction. Once that distinction collapses, so does Ely's 
demonstration. 
97. Especially in cases like Brown, where the constitutional text suggests that Congress, and 
not the Court, ought to be the main enforcer of the equal protection clause. 
98. Ely's adoption of the Carolene Products idea that the Court ought to protect discrete and 
insular minorities, because they will not be able to protect themselves in the political process, is 
not defended upon any political theory whatsoever and in fact is probably politically naive. 
Compare Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) with Farber & 
Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil 
Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1991). 
99. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REv. 1, 2 (1979). For other leading public values theories of judicial review, see M. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF 
CONSIITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: 
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judicial review are consciously inspired by Brown. Among the lessons 
of Brown are the importance of our tradition of ongoing moral devel-
opment, the "prophetic'.' role of courts in stimulating this ongoing 
moral dialectic in light of structural impediments elsewhere in the 
political process, and a diminished concern for the legal process 
countermajoritarian difficulty given our nation's substantive 
commitments. 
II. BEYOND LEGAL PROCESS: NEW PUBLIC LAW 
Although our first account of the jurisprudence of public law dis-
course probably approximates the conventional wisdom, we think it 
does not quite capture everything that has been going on in public law 
for the past ten or fifteen years. Our second account deemphasizes the 
sense of continuity in the preceding account and instead emphasizes 
the rupture between the legal process generation and our own genera-
tion. The recent interest of mainstream legal academics in feminism, 
civic republicanism, critical race theory, public choice theory, and her-
meneutics is no accident, nor is it merely a faddish response to the 
law-and-economics and CLS problems with traditional process theory. 
Instead, this interest is a manifestation of dissatisfaction with legal 
process assumptions in light of the events of our lifetime. 
The heirs of the legal process scholars were also the heirs of the 
civil rights movement, and the events of our generation sharpened the 
critique of legal process' assumptions and its flight from substance. 
Post-legal process scholarship has returned to substantive discussion, 
but with a variety of twists. Conservative law-and-economics scholars 
objected to the ad hoc craftlike quality of the legal process approach; 
they sought to develop a more scientific Oess prudential) methodology 
for achieving the utilitarian goals implicit in legal process. CLS schol-
ars objected to the status quo orientation of legal process; they sought 
to repoliticize what the process theorists had taken as merely technical 
or functional. A centrist post-legal process group - situated between 
law and economics and CLS - has emerged as well, and this group 
might be called a New Public Law movement. What makes New Pub-
lic Law something more than just more and newer legal process is its 
conscious rejection of the pluralist political features of legal process 
theory. Where even progressive legal process scholars tended to as-
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teach-
ing of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 
(1988); Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. Cr. 
REv. 127. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502 
(1985), is an excellent critical analysis of these theories. 
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sume that people's preferences are predetermined, that politics primar-
ily consists of the aggregation or compromises of preferences, and that 
norms are less important than process, New Public Law scholars of 
the 1980s suggested the outlines of an antipluralist conception oflaw, 
where people's preferences are formed through politics and not prior 
to it, where law and politics are socially constructed, and where law 
and politics are heavily normative. 
A. After Legal Process ... 
The generation of baby boomers that grew up after World War II 
and the Korean War was thrown into a world in which the assump-
tions of legal process and its apologetic agenda were open to question. 
To the legal process mind, the world was a manichaean world of our-
good-democracy against their-bad-dictatorship, and legal process was 
the justifying theory of that perceived goodness and rationality. A 
new generation has reinterpreted that world as a schizophrenic world 
of good rhetoric masking bad reality, and many of us came to see the 
legal process not only as a mask, but as a mode of oppression. We 
hope to capture here the way in which the intellectual developments 
after the 1950s connected with the events of that period to create a 
generation that wants something more than legal process. 
The intellectual consensus that our government was truly an open, 
pluralist, free democracy ended in the late 1950s. While most academ-
ics in the early 1950s readily accepted the optimistic scenario that our 
pluralist government was broadly representative of the nation's diverse 
groups and yielded policies that subserved the public interest (vari-
ously defined), this view came under attack in the latter part of the 
decade and was widely disbelieved in the 1960s. An obvious problem 
with American pluralism was that the tolerant ideology of openness 
and experimentation served to obscure the realities of social determi-
nation along lines of race, gender, and sexual orientation. As one 
critic noted, "[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."100 
Theoretically, a number of interesting interpretations could ex-
plain this phenomenon. Public choice theory suggested some reasons 
for the asymmetries of American pluralism: interest groups are much 
more likely to organize and be politically salient if they are small, 
100. E. SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960); see c. MILLS, THE 
POWER ELITE (1956); D. CORY [a pseudonym] THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJEC-
TIVE APPROACH (1951); B. FREIDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1960); G. MYRDAL, AN 
AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). This criticism is accepted today even by strong defenders of plu-
ralism. E.g., R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY vs. CONTROL 40-
43 (1982). 
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wealthy, and homogeneous, and as a result the interests of most Amer-
icans are not well-represented in a pluralist system; the groups repre-
sented in the process tend to divide up the spoils of government (rents) 
through a process of logrolling. 101 For example, a public choice expla-
nation of the politics of nuclear regulation in Warshow .would empha-
size the political power of the nuclear power industry (small numbers, 
very wealthy, and politically connected), as well as the difficulty that 
antinuclear protesters have in overcoming the free rider problem as 
they try to mobilize the public against the dangers of nuclear power. 
Public choice theorists tended to approach the dysfunctions of Ameri-
can pluralism in a nonevaluative way, but the same was decidedly not 
true of political scientists, some of whom questioned the legitimacy of 
a pluralism that seemed little more than a "democratic elitism."102 
The political system that jailed the Vermont Yankee protesters was 
not necessarily one that represented the interests or desires of the peo-
ple, and the court's result removed the only voice of ordinary people 
- the jury - from the case. 
The political awareness and events of the 1960s reinforced these 
criticisms of pluralism as a closed system dominated by upper class 
white males, which actively suppressed rather than fostered openness 
and diversity in 'our public culture. The classic example was racial 
apartheid in the South (and parts of the North), in which the so-called 
pluralist political system perpetuated its own elites by segregating Af-
rican-Americans from minimal educational opportunities, enjoyment 
of public facilities, housing, and jobs.103 Where the New Deal and 
legal process thought had been substantially blind to the scandal of 
apartheid, it galvanized our generation, as did the men and women 
who opposed it in the civil rights movement. In the 1960s, the critique 
of American democracy, begun in 'the civil rights movement, was 
broadened; racial apartheid was simply the most obvious evidence of 
the closure of pluralism. Also excluded and suppressed, though in va-
rying degrees, were women, Hispanics, the urban poor, migrant work-
ers, the handicapped, and gay men and lesbians; each of these groups 
101. M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); see J. BUCHANAN & G. TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CoNSTITUTIONAL DEMOC-
RACY (1962); A. DOWNS, AN EcONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); E. 
SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, PoLmcs, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE EN-
TERPRISE IN PRESSURE PoLmcs, As SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF 
(1935) (anticipating most of the themes of public choice theory). 
102. P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELmSM: A CRmQUE (1967); see Da-
vis, The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy, 17 W. POL. Q., 37 (1964); 
Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677 
(1964). 
103. For early accounts of this travesty, see G. MYRDAL, supra note 100. 
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in turn demanded recognition of their place in the political community 
in the 1960s or 1970s. This experience turned the relativist theory of 
democracy on its head. What was touted as a superior form of govern-
ment because of its openness, tolerance, and diversity, was revealed to 
be a political system whose closure, bigotry, and artificially imposed 
homogeneity inspired sincere charges of fascism. 
A related theoretical problem with the relativist or pluralist theory 
of democracy, and its accompanying legal process philosophy, was the 
way in which it denied possibilities for self-government and thereby 
drained democracy of its tranformative and energizing punch.104 That 
is, by defining "politics" as the relatively narrow and formalized con-
flict among organized economic groups within the legislature or ad-
ministrative process, the ideology of political pluralism implicitly 
obscured the possibility of other forms of political struggle outside that 
process, of grass roots politics and community organizing, and of or-
ganizing politics around ideological issues rather than narrowly de-
fined economic issues. For example, by treating the case as one of 
simple trespass and by suppressing the first amendment implications 
of the criminal prosecution, Warshow seemed to deny the intrinsically 
"political" nature of the protesters' activity. 
Like the bias critique of pluralism, this suppression-of-politics cri-
tique resonated with the lived experience of the 1960s. Union-organiz-
ing within the workplace had long been an inspiring counterexample 
to pluralism's narrow conception of politics, but in the 1950s and 
1960s the civil rights movement gained prominence as the classic 
counterexample. The movement broke many of the rules that guided 
pluralism, for it ignored economic interests and created an ideological 
community dedicated to abolishing apartheid, emphasized direct com-
munity action and resort to the courts rather than petitions to the leg-
islatures that were effectively dead ends, and - most alarming of all 
from the pluralist/legal process perspective - engaged in disruptive 
activity such as "illegal" boycotts, marches, and sit-ins Gust as in War-
show). This was disturbing to the legal process mentality, for the civil 
rights movement's effort to transform the larger community outside 
the ordinary political process conflicted with the principle of institu-
tional settlement. "They" did not follow the proper procedures and 
thereby violated the special "oughtness" of the legal process state. 
"This is not how our system of government was meant to operate," 
104. W. CONNOLLY, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3 
(1969); see P. BACHRACH, supra note 102; Cunningham, Pluralism and the Class Struggle, 39 
SCI. & SocY. 385, 415-16 (1975-76). 
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proclaimed the Warshow concurrence.1os 
By the late 1960s, the challenge to legal process pluralism had be-
come substantially more direct.106 Although the mainstream civil 
rights movement had worked within the legal process to seek desegre-
gation of schools through the courts and transformative legislation 
through Congress, events were nonetheless careening away from the 
accommodationist pluralist structure. Confrontationist tactics became 
more common, both by blacks seeking civil rights and by new opposi-
tionist groups. Opponents of the war in Vietnam burned draft cards, 
refused to register for the draft, occupied campus buildings, and 
drenched military records with blood. Gay men and lesbians fought 
back when police staged a harassing raid on the Stonewall bar and 
invaded meetings of the American Psychiatric Association to protest 
its historic persecution. Pro-environment protesters closed down nu-
clear power plants by their sit-ins, as in Warshow. All of these groups 
were following a new antipluralist strategy of confrontation: Wasn't a 
confrontational strategy which disarmed the process of its diluting, de-
laying, and draining proceduralism a better strategy than one which 
accepted the process on its own biased terms? 
The increasing public bitterness against the fruits of the legal pro-
cess, especially apartheid and the Vietnam War, ties in with a third 
theme of the intellectual critique of democratic relativism. The cri-
tique focused on the pluralist/process flight from values and chal-
lenged democracy to prove its worthiness. By elevating process goals, 
such as stability of the ongoing political system, over substantive 
goals, 107 and emphasizing a normless pragmatism, 108 pluralism de-
' 105. Warshaw, 138 Vt. at 28, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring). 
106. See generally Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758. 
107. The view of most pluralists in the 1950s was that "[w]hat may be called public policy is 
actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment." Latham, The 
Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 376, 390 (1952); see H. 
SMITH, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 77-93, 155-59 (1960) (public interest is 
equivalent to the results of a well-designed democratic process working in equilibrium); Sorauf, 
The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19 J. PoL. 616 (1957). Given the evidence of group asymme-
try, this view of public policy became less normatively attractive for pluralist theory in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Pluralist theory thereupon shifted its normative emphasis to the argument that its 
system of pluralistic preferences in continual interaction (bargaining, political conflict) contrib-
utes to the stability and moderation of society. See S. LIPSET, PoLmCAL MAN: THE SOCIAL 
BASES OF PoLmcs 77-79 (1963); Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
734 (1983). 
108. See P. BACHRACH, supra note 102, at 93 (because democratic theory is "explanatory 
rather than normative in approach,'' it reflects "a receptiveness toward the existing structure of 
power and elite decision-making"); E. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 269-70 ("Pragmatism required 
a broad set of social values that would provide the criteria both for what ought to be done and 
what was actually successful. Without a clear and critical political analysis, and with a funda-
mental prescriptive-descriptive confusion, pragmatically based relativist theory easily accepted 
the existent as its set of validating social ideals."). 
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fleeted attention from the public good and indeed de-energized efforts 
to define or seek the public good.109 In the context of the mass mobili-
zations of the 1960s, it seemed morally empty for establishment figures 
to tell protesters, "Write your Congressman." Along these lines, con-
sider the particular flatness of the Warshow concurrence: "I express 
no opinion as to the relative merits or demerits of nuclear energy, nor 
do I question the sincerity of the defendants' beliefs. All that I would 
hold is that this Court is not the proper forum to grant defendants the 
relief they seek."110 
The collapse of intellectual consensus about the relativistic theory 
of democracy finds its parallel in an erosion of confidence in legal pro-
cess theory after the events of the 1960s. The vividness of the Hart 
and Sacks synthesis of post-New Deal jurisprudence, the image of a 
unified and progressive legal academy organized around core ideas 
shared by the enlightened world, gave way to feelings of partiality and 
rootlessness. When the artificially imposed 1950s consensus about val-
ues collapsed in the 1960s, legal process had nothing to replace the lost 
consensus, except an increasingly empty proceduralism. As a result, 
legal process scholarship in the 1960s unconsciously drifted into dis-
cussions of craft and technique, without any real sense that the schol-
arship was confirmed by or relevant to anything important. The legal 
process synthesis languished in the 1970s, as liberals (Ely, the War-
show dissent) traded arguments with conservatives (Bork, the War-
show concurrence) within the assumptions of the legal process 
analytic, but no longer with a sense that it made any real difference. 
The situation was in fact worse than that. Just as legal process 
theory had achieved hegemonic status at many law schools, it fell 
under the fierce analytic assault of law and economics and CLS. De-
spite their great differences, these two movements had in common a 
thoroughgoing intellectual critique of the legal process hegemony they 
confronted. Both found the legal process synthesis lacking in analyti-
cal rigor, a modem theory of politics, and persuasive reasons for law-
yers to continue to accept its conclusions. Although legal process 
sought to marginalize both law and economics and CLS as "extrem-
ist" ideologically driven factions - the strategy that had worked to 
discredit the realists and the formalists in the 1940s and 1950s - its 
109. See Cochran, Political Science and "The Public Interest," 36 J. POL. 327 (1974); P. 
BACHRACH, supra note 102, at 99-100 ("At the outset the democratic theorist must abandon 
explanatory theory as an approach to his subject. By adhering to it he tends to accept as unalter-
able the configuration of society as shaped by impersonal forces. . . . Instead, what we must 
acquire ... is a healthy dose of Promethean defiance against the illiberal and impersonal forces 
which tend to devastate us."). 
110. Warshow, 138 Vt. at 28, 410 A.2d at 1003 (Hill, J., concurring). 
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efforts failed, and the attacks on legal process exposed its emptiness 
and dearth of answers to modem problems. 
Law and economics, for example, shared the legal process commit-
ment to a status quo-oriented pluralism, but then demonstrated that 
legal process-endorsed conventional New Deal answers to social 
problems were normatively useless, based upon a systematic 
microeconomic theory that argued the market (the private sphere) 
would swallow up attempts at legal reform (the public sphere). CLS 
attacked the status quo orientation of legal process and argued that its 
efforts at legal reform were merely apologist efforts by ruling elites to· 
create the illusion but not the reality of social justice; critical scholars 
systematically undermined the analytical tools by which legal process 
thinkers built their arguments, thereby exposing legal process to 
charges of class bias and elitism. Legal process had no systematic an-
swers to the analytics of law and economics and CLS. Once the dis-
cussion shifted from process to substance, legal process had little to 
offer. 
B. Beyond Legal Process: Normativism and the New Public Law 
The collapse oflegal process paved the way for a new generation of 
legal scholars to seize the middle ground between Chicago School law 
and economics, which struck many as normatively impoverished and 
apologetic, and CLS, which struck many as insufficiently affirmative in 
its agenda. New Public Law was the response of those in the baby 
boom generation for whom Brown is central to public law rather than 
marginal. New Public Law should be seen as a generational move-
ment reflecting changes in our professional culture, assumptions about 
government, and aspirations about law (see Table 2 below). 
744 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:707 
TABLE 2 
FROM COMMON LAW FORMALISM TO THE NEW PUBLIC LAW 
Common Law Formalism 
(1890s-1900s) 
Relatively Closed 
(WASP Elites) 
Lawyer as Hired Gun 
Lawyers as Bastions of 
the Status Quo 
Legal Process 
(1940s-1950s) 
Professional Culture 
Small Influx of Ethnic 
Lawyers 
Lawyer as Public Servant 
Lawyers as Reformers 
New Public Law 
(1970s-1980s) 
Substantial Influx of 
Lawyers of Different 
Race, Gender, Culture 
Public Interest Lawyering 
Lawyers as Restructurers 
of Status Quo 
Assumptions About Government 
Common Law Ground Government Regulation New Forms of 
Rules Regulation, or 
Deregulation 
Primacy of Private over Interaction of Private & Denial of Public/Private 
Public Public but Primacy of Distinction 
Public Interest 
Formalism Proceduralism Normativism 
Underlying Intellectual Structures 
Liberalism: Purposivism: Public Values: 
Community as Collection Community as the State Community as Interacting 
of Individuals Groups 
Market Values Perfected Market Values Nonmarket Values 
Liberty Practicality & Neutrality Equality 
The typical New Public Law scholar is someone born into a well-
to-do family between World War II and the War in Vietnam. He or 
she grew up in relative affluence, never served in the armed forces, and 
majored in a liberal arts subject at a tony undergraduate college. A 
part of his or her undergraduate experience was participation in pro-
test rallies such as the one at Vermont Yankee, although like the Ver-
mont Yankee protesters he or she was not likely to have been smacked 
in the face by a police officer or subjected to terrible inconvenience for 
these protest activities. An important reason for going to law school 
(often after graduate work in another discipline) was his or her desire 
to replicate the Brown experience he or she so admired: Law becomes 
one further means of protesting social injustice and perhaps doing 
something to rectify such injustices. 
Our typical New Public Law scholar then attended an elite law 
school in the late 1960s or 1970s.111 The law school environment at 
111. Often Harvard or Yale. It seems worth noting that virtually all of these people would 
have been out of place in the Yale or Harvard Law Schools of the era of common law formalism, 
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that time embodied the best of the legal process tradition, emphasizing 
a vigorously reformist approach to the status quo, whose overall legiti-
macy was broadly assumed. Often reflecting his or her own graduate 
school experience and the eclectic pedagogical agenda at the major law 
schools, 112 the typical budding New Public Law scholar from the be-
ginning of his or her academic career has been interested in intellec-
tual developments outside of law, especially developments in political 
theory and economics. He or she is also an avid reader of CLS schol-
arship and is impressed with its vision but believes it is "too nega-
tive." 113 He or she thinks scholarship can· contribute positive insights 
to law. The scholar has an ambitious vision of scholarship as not pri-
marily doctrinal, but as integration of new thinking about govenui:ient, 
politics, and law into legal topics (including doctrinal topics). His or 
her audience is not primarily the practitioner, nor is it the radical law-
yer or even the public defender; instead, it is other boomer elites -
law professors, legislative counsel, journalists, and sundry intellectuals 
of the baby boom generation or later. The message of these scholars is 
that legal process is not enough in very important ways, at least im-
plicitly for some of the reasons developed above. 
The positive themes of New Public Law scholarship are by neces-
sity somewhat eclectic (see Table 2 above), but we shall explore them 
in some detail here.114 The central difference between the New Public 
Law and legal process theory (even its progressive mode) is the New 
Public Law's self-conscious rejection of the ideology embodied in the 
relativist theory of democracy. The rejection of this ideology has freed 
New Public Law scholars to talk about law in the discourse of a com-
peting ideology, "normativism,"115 which is antipluralist, antiformal-
because they were Jewish, or female, or black, or Hispanic, or gay, or some combination. About 
half of these people would have been out of place at those law schools during the legal process 
era, because they were female, or black, or Hispanic, or gay, or some combination. Although 
they came of age in a period when this heterogeneity was more common in the professional 
world, many of these scholars will have been subjected to insulting incidents by professionals 
prejudiced against them on grounds of race, sex, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Notwithstand· 
ing their privileged upbringing, they may as a group be unusually sensitive to subtle forms of 
discrimination, inequality, and prejudice. On the other hand, many are neither particularly bit-
ter nor angry about their brushes with prejudice. We want to be clear here that not all Jews, 
women, African-Americans, Hispanics, gay men, and lesbians have gravitated to New Public 
Law discourse. Many have embraced CLS. It does appear that both New Public Law and CLS 
are significantly more diverse than legal process and law and economics have traditionally been. 
112. See Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. 
REv. 761 (1987); Cook, supra note 54. 
113. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 50; McDougall, supra note 52, at 94-98. 
114. This account has been guided by Eskridge, supra note 4; McDougall, supra note 52; 
Rodriguez, supra note 52; Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1835 (1988). 
115. A term suggested to us by Alex Aleinikolf and first used in Eskridge, supra note 4, at 
964 & n.105. 
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ist, and strongly value-oriented. The remainder of this Part is an 
explication of normativism. In this section, we set forth the basic 
precepts of normativism, and develop its differences with progressive 
legal process theory by application to our Case of the Nuclear Protes-
ters. Three precepts are critical to the New Public Law: (1) The legit-
imacy of law rests upon its normative content and not its procedural 
pedigree. (2) Law is not just purposive, but is formative, destructive, 
and transformative. (3) Law is dialogical practical reasoning. The 
next section will explore the third precept in greater detail, in the con-
text of several identifiably New Public Law articles and in the context 
of the "Case of the Gay Rights Coalition." 
1. The Normativity of Law 
Common law formalism celebrated the neutrality of law as essen-
tial for the preservation of the security of the private domain. It 
strikes us as rather surprising that legal process - the comprehensive 
public law theory for the New Deal's regulatory state - also cele-
brated the neutrality of law, as practically useful in enabling people to 
live in an interdependent community. Both the concurring and dis-
senting opinions in Warshow emphasized the neutrality and objectivity 
of their interpretations of the common law and relevant statutes. New 
Public Law thinkers do not consider the law neutral and objective. In 
part, the denial of neutrality/objectivity is a descriptive claim, with 
several interesting twists. 116 Law is contextual: it cannot be separated 
from society, its values, and its socioeconomic structure. Law is defin-
ing: it helps shape society, its values, and socioeconomic structure. 
Law is interpretive: it is the result of a dynamic process by which the 
perspectives of an interpreter and a text merge to yield an 
interpretation. 
In part, the denial of neutrality/objectivity is also a prescriptive 
claim.117 Claims of neutrality are denials of normativity, the value 
choices that are inherent in law and social practice. If value choices 
are being made, it is best to recognize them as such. When you study 
the three opinions in Warshow - one mechanically formalist, one con-
servative legal process, one progressive legal process - you find them 
116. The discussion in this paragraph is most influenced by: (1) feminism, see C. MACKIN· 
NON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Minow, supra note 55; (2) hermeneutics, see Eskridge, 
supra note 56; and (3) pragmatism, see Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in Ameri-
can Legal Thought, supra note 57; Patterson, Law's Practice (Book Review), 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 
575 (1990). 
117. For philosophical treatments of this denial, see R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJ!!CTIVISM 
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1985); Peller, supra note 5, at 
1191-259. 
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essentially empty and disappointing. The debate between the majority 
and concurring opinions about the requirements of the necessity de-
fense, and the debate between the concurring and dissenting opinions 
over whether or not the legislature had established a rule for decision, 
are equally sterile. Neither debate, and none of the opinions, ad-
dresses the significant moral and policy issues that are necessarily im-
plicated in any decision on the merits: What would be the policy 
consequences, ex ante, of permitting the necessity defense in nuclear 
protest cases? Is it fair to use criminal sanctions as a restraint on 
speech about an important public issue? How real were the dangers 
posed by the Vermont Yankee reactor? 
There is no way for the law to be "neutral" in this case. Recogniz-
ing this, the New Public Law challenges legal decisionmakers to jus-
tify their interventions on the merits. They cannot conceal their 
partisanship behind precedent, or empirical studies, or procedures. 
Under this ideology, moreover, law should be value-laden, because 
government is best conceived as the deliberation of an egalitarian citi-
zenry seeking the public good.118 New Public Law tends to reject the 
heavy reliance of traditional theories upon jurisprudential positivism. 
It argues that the legitimacy of government rests primarily upon the 
values it represents, and not upon its procedural pedigree.119 
2. Law as Transformation, Preferences as Endogenous 
Unlike progressive legal process theory, New Public Law posits 
that law is more than facilitative (enabling interdependent humans to 
live together); it is both formative and transformative. Law can make 
118. Thus, New Public Law is sympathetic to the claims of the "republican revival." His-
torians have argued the relevance of republican thought to the framing of the Constitution. See 
D. EPSTEIN, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIA-
VELLIAN MOMENT 506-52 (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776-1787 (1969); Appleby, Republicanism in Old and New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 20 
(1986). Several New Public Law scholars view civic republicanism as an attractive normative 
framework for thinking about law and government. See Michelman, supra note 53; Sherry, supra 
note 53; Sunstein, supra note 53. 
119. We think the celebrated thought-problem posed by J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, So-
CIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 242 (1961), sets forth this position nicely: 
Let us transport ourselves into a hypothetical country that, in a democratic way, practices 
the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughtering of Jews. We 
should certainly not approve of these practices on the ground that they have been decided 
on according to the rules of democratic procedure. But the crucial question is: would we 
approve of the democratic constitution itself that produced such results in preference to a 
non-democratic one that would avoid them? 
Schumpeter answers the question in the negative, suggesting that a democratic government 
which did these things (by the way, not so far removed from apartheid, which sanctioned lynch-
ing, persecution, and segregation of African-Americans in the 1950s) was not legitimate. For 
modem legal variations on the theme that law's legitimacy depends upon its substance and not 
just its process, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 72, at 206-15 (contrasting "community of princi-
ple" as a more legitimate basis for social ordering than a "rulebook community"). 
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us a "better" community, it can make us a "worse" community. Law 
is part of a web of sociopolitical structures that are constitutive - and 
reconstitutive - of our community. 
New Public Law is skeptical of traditional pluralism and its as-
sumptions.120 The key challenge is to the pluralist assumption that 
people's preferences in the political and legal process are exogenous, 
namely, that they are predetermined, independent of and prior to 
political activity. This assumption seems crazy to the generation 
whose members saw the civil rights debate transform people's beliefs 
about segregation and discrimination, whose antiwar protests toppled 
a president, and whose celebration of Earth Day changed the land-
scape of public policy. New Public Law scholars believe that people's 
preferences are endogenous to the political process.121 "Politics is a 
process . . . for making the self-defining choices that constitute our 
moral freedom. . . . Such choices by their nature have to be made 
jointly, that is to say politically. Public values, then, are a necessary 
accompaniment of the moral freedom of the individual."122 
This idea relates to a conclusion drawn from law's normativity: 
law is responsible for doing something about the substantive ills of our 
society. Legal process theory essentially accepted the role of law as 
solving collective action and other problems brought to it by the pri-
vate sector, partly because it accepted the idea that politics and law are 
a response to private preferences. Once it is accepted that people's 
preferences are inseparable from politics and law, law must accept 
some responsibility for social injustices and ought to gravitate toward 
transformation of the conditions generating the injustices and the atti-
tudes tolerating them. Under this ideology, Warshow's failure to grap-
ple with the intensely political issues posed by the case was 
irresponsible, and the majority's refusal even to let the jury discuss the 
issues looks antidemocratic. One can then see that the relatively re-
sponsible people in the case were John Warshaw and the other defend-
ants - "criminals" according to the legal process - for it is they who 
120. Much of what follows is inspired by several interconnected intellectual movements, in-
cluding (1) "civic republicanism," revived by historians to explain the political thought of the 
Framers, see supra note 116; (2) "communitarianism," which rejects liberalism's tendency to 
separate the individual from the community, see M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE (1982); Regan, Community and Justice in Constitutional Theory, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 
1073; and (3) developments in "liberal" political theory that point away from the extreme indi-
vidualism of some variations. See Sunstein, supra note 53. 
121. See Cover, supra note 54; Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). 
122. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979). 
February 1991] New Public Law 749 
alerted the community to issues that were being swept under the table 
by the company, the regulators, and ultimately by the court. 
3. Law as Practical Reasoning 
Closely related to the normativity and formative/transformative 
nature oflaw is a third claim of New Public Law ideology. It is rather 
complicated and may profitably be broken into three interrelated as-
sertions: law is politics, politics is the making of decisions that affect 
the community, and the dynamics of politics ought to be dialogic prac-
tical reasoning rather than coercive rule or rights enforcement. 
The first two assertions are primarily descriptive and are more rad-
ical than they might seem at first, for they separate law from govern-
ment. To be sure, government may be our most important source of 
law, because our communities spend substantial resources making de-
cisions through government, typically in the form of statutes that are 
fleshed out by judicial and agency interpretations. But the law of such 
statutes is often determined in practice by lower level officials who 
implement them, by private lawyers who interpret them to their cli-
ents and others, and by lay people who are the statutes' ultimate audi-
ence. For example, the criminal trespass statute involved in Warshow 
probably does not prohibit any and all unpermitted entries onto Ver-
mont Yankee's property. If a group of children entered the property, 
it is doubtful that Vermont Yankee would have called the police, and 
even more unlikely that the police would have arrested the children if 
they had been called. Indeed, if John Warshow had shown up at the 
plant alone and with a sign around his neck protesting the reactor's 
operation, it is not clear that Vermont Yankee would have com-
plained. The plant and the authorities, of course, sprung into action 
when John Warshow showed up as part of a larger group seeking to 
keep the plant closed. All of these scenarios involve the creation of 
"law," and it can readily be seen that we cannot talk about "law" 
(even conventional statute-type law) without talking about the larger 
web of societal power relationships. 
If law is a sociopolitical process of norm creation, it usually in-
volves centers of sociopolitical power, including protest groups and 
homeowners and companies, as well as agencies and courts. We all 
know that the law created in such situations of power often favors elite 
status quo groups (the haves) - Vermont Yankee management and 
shareholders in Warshow - over the less wealthy (the have nots) -
the people living in Vernon, Vermont (the people who would be killed 
and contaminated if a meltdown occurred) and the environmental 
protesters. The haves in Warshaw had the support of the police, the 
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regulatory agency, and the court system, yet without any reason for us 
to believe that their operation of the power plant was safe and "law-
ful." The possibility is tangible that the haves won in Warshow be-
cause they were powerful. 
As a normative matter, the New Public Law resists this. If law is 
politics, including social politics, the New Public Law rejects the plu-
ralist vision of politics as deals struck on grounds of relative socioeco-
nomic power. In its place, the New Public Law urges that the politics 
of norm creation constitutes a process of practical reasoning, and calls 
upon the "professional community to construct . . . an ongoing con-
versation about the pursuit of activist values in an incredibly complex 
world."123 This ongoing conversation helps define the New Public 
Law's commitment to practical reasoning. In the spirit of the New 
Public Law, we turn to concrete examples of such practical reasoning, 
through a second case example and several representative law review 
articles. 
C. Law as Practical Reasoning 
To concretize what we mean by the New Public Law, and how it 
relates to themes of feminism, republicanism, pragmatism, and herme-
neutics (in particular), we now tum to several articles that are distinc-
tively "New Public Law" in their ideology and approach. And we 
apply the precepts of these articles to our second case example, Gay 
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown 
University. 124 Georgetown (where we both teach) is a Catholic univer-
sity in Washington, D.C., and the Gay Rights Coalition is one of two 
groups of gay and lesbian students that sought university recognition 
in and after 1978. Reasoning that university recognition would imply 
approval of the gay and lesbian group, contrary to Catholic doctrine, 
Georgetown denied the Coalition's application. The Coalition sued 
Georgetown for damages and an injunction, arguing that George-
town's refusal to recognize the student groups violated the District's 
Human Rights Act, which makes it "an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice ... for an educational institution ... [t]o deny, restrict or to 
abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any 'of its facilities and 
services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or partially, for a 
discriminatory reason, based upon ... sexual orientation .... " 125 
The District's Court of Appeals held that the Human Rights Act 
123. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 20. 
124. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
125. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520(1) (1981); see D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981) (intent of 
D.C. Council "to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason 
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required Georgetown to provide the gay and lesbian student groups 
with equal access to funds and facilities but not to recognize the 
groups, and that as interpreted the statute did not violate George-
town's first amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The opin-
ion announcing the judgment of the seven-judge court was delivered 
by Judge Mack,126 with Judge Newman writing a concurring opinion 
differing in important respects from Judge Mack's opinion.127 Judges 
Ferren and Terry dissented from the court's holding that Georgetown 
University did not have to recognize the gay and lesbian groups, 128 
and Judges Nebeker and Belson dissented from the court's holding 
that the Act could constitutionally require Georgetown to provide 
equal access to gay and lesbian student groups. 129 
Unlike Warshow, the Case of the Gay Rights Coalition yielded a 
rich debate on the merits of Georgetown University's exclusion of gay 
and lesbian student groups. And whereas the dissenting opinion in 
Warshow was at most an exemplar of the "new" legal process, Judge 
Mack's opinion in Gay Rights Coalition is an early New Public Law 
exemplar, as is the partial dissent by Judge Ferren. Judge Mack's 
opinion first details the conflict between Georgetown University and 
the gay and lesbian students seeking to organize, 130 then applies the 
Human Rights Act to the carefully delineated factual setting in light 
of the competing constitutional values, 131 and finally evaluates the 
constitutionality of the Act as applied.132 In contrast to all the (for-
malist and legal process) opinions in Warshow and to the (formalist 
and legal process) opinions by Judges Nebeker and Newman in Gay 
Rights Coalition, Judge Mack's opinion is explicitly normative in its 
focus and evolution of the competing values involved in both statutory 
and constitutional interpretation; is antipluralist in its sensitivity to the 
values of two conflicting groups and in its efforts to transform the con-
flictual situation by an accommodationist compromise; and is contex-
tual rather than abstract, engaged rather than neutral, and 
community-building rather than rights-oriented in its practical reason-
other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination by reason of ... 
sexual orientation"); D.C. ConE ANN. § 1-2502(28) (1981) (defining "sexual orientation"). 
126. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 5 (Mack, J., delivering the judgment of the court). 
Chief Judge Pryor essentially joined her opinion. 536 A.2d at 39 (Pryor, C.J., concurring). 
127. 536 A.2d at 40 (Newman, J., concurring). 
128. 536 A.2d at 46 (Ferren, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part); 536 
A.2d at 74 (Terry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
129. 536 A.2d at 62 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 526 A.2d at 75 
(Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
130. 536 A.2d at 5-14 (opinion of Mack, J.). o 
131. 536 A.2d at 16-30. 
132. 536 A.2d at 30-39. 
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ing. In the way it "does law," Judge Mack's opinion parallels recent 
New Public Law scholarship. We use this scholarship to deepen our 
analysis of her opinion. 
1. Public Values in Statutory Interpretation 
A distinctively New Public Law scholarship is emerging in the 
field of statutory interpretation.133 Deeply influenced by republican-
ism, hermeneutics, and pragmatic philosophy, New Public Law schol-
arship goes well beyond the progressive legal process position that 
interpretation is dynamic and must carry out the statute's purposes 
over time. Applying republican ideals, New Public Law scholars tend 
to criticize traditional approaches to statutory interpretation (textual-
ism, intentionalism, purposivism) as indeterminate and milve. 134 They 
argue that statutory interpretation is decisively influenced by back-
ground assumptions and values, often controversial, held by the inter-
preter; 135 and endorse the importance of these assumptions (usually 
expressed as presumptions, clear statement rules, and canons of statu-
tory interpretation) if and only if they are updated to reflect the eco-
nomic and social needs of the modem regulatory state. 136 The 
practical reasoning urged by New Public Law scholars is illustrated by 
several features of Judge Mack's opinion in Gay Rights Coalition, 
namely, (1) its explicit invocation of background norms in doing statu-
tory interpretation, (2) its critical evaluative stance toward the legisla-
tive materials, and (3) its careful treatment of colliding norms. 
The lower court in Gay Rights Coalition had applied the statutory 
"plain meaning" (so popular in the 1980s) to require Georgetown Uni-
versity to recognize the gay and lesbian student groups and then de-
clared the Act an unconstitutional abridgement of first amendment 
rights. New Public Law scholars are highly critical of the na'ive form 
of the plain meaning approach, because it wrongly denies the depen-
dence of text upon "both culture and context," especially background 
133. See Aleinikoff, supra note 64; Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Mootz, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: 
A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 523 (1988); Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance 
and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988); Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1985 Term - Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 61; Zeppos, supra note 64. See generally 
Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construe· 
lion, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REv. 815 (1990). 
134. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989); 
Sunstein, Interpretiqg Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
135. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1019-61; Sunstein, supra note 134, at 420-62. 
136. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1073-92; Sunstein, supra note 134, at 462-503. 
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norms.137 Judge Mack does not start with the statutory plain mean-
ing. Instead, she starts with an explicit consideration of the constitu-
tional norms as background assumptions for the interpretive 
enterprise.138 Invoking the traditional canon that statutes should be 
interpreted to avoid constitutional problems, Judge Mack explores 
Georgetown's argument that allowing gay and lesbian groups on cam-
pus would threaten the university's Catholic traditions. She then 
turns to a careful examination of the record, from which she draws the 
conclusion that Georgetown's main difficulty was with a requirement 
that it "endorse" gay and lesbian student groups, which could be dis-
aggregated from tangible benefits implicated in requiring equal "ac-
cess" of gay and lesbian student groups to university facilities. 139 Only 
in the context of these facts and of the constitutional norms does Judge 
Mack, finally, return to the statutory text, which she finds receptive to 
the interpretation that Georgetown must provide equal access to "fa-
cilities and services" but need not provide an official endorsement.140 
What is most impressive about Judge Mack's opinion is its open ac-
knowledgement that statutory text must be interpreted against the 
background of other norms and the facts of the case. 
Another feature of New Public Law practical reasoning, as devel-
oped in these articles, is its relentlessly critical stance toward statutory 
materials. Their emphasis is examination and not deference. 141 Just 
as Judge Mack's opinion refreshingly avoids formalist cant about 
"plain meaning," it also avoids reasonless "deference" to made-up 
"legislative intent." For example, when Judge Mack analyzes George-
town's argument that the Human Rights Act as interpreted violates 
the free exercise of religion, her opinion digs through the Act's (un-
published) legislative history to demonstrate the District's "compel-
ling interest" in ending discrimination against gay men and lesbians142 
but refuses to stop with the lessons of the legislative history. Over the 
objections of one of her concurring brethren that the court defer to the 
137. Sunstein, supra note 134, at 416; see id. at 415-24; Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1018-29; 
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990). 
138. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 16 (opinion of Mack, J.); see 536 A.2d at 21-36 (ex-
amining constitutional values). This precept of statutory interpretation is a key "canon" in Es-
kridge, supra note 134, at 1020-22 (analysis of this canon); Sunstein, supra note 134, at 468-69. 
139. 536 A.2d at 16-20. 
140. 536 A.2d at 21-30. 
141. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1063-73, 1085-86; Sunstein, supra note 134, at 444-46; see 
Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Understanding in the Mod-
em Regulatory State, J.L. EcoN. & ORG. (forthcoming 1991); Sunstein, Law and Administration 
After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990). 
142. 536 A.2d at 31-33 (opinion of Mack, J.). 
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well-deliberated legislative judgment, 143 Judge Mack subjects the anti-
discrimination policy to independent normative examination. Her his-
tory and evaluation of the treatment of gay men and lesbians in this 
country leads her to conclude that not only were there compelling pol-
icy reasons behind the District's law, but also that constitutional con-
cerns favoring equal treatment of gay men and lesbians further 
buttressed the District's compelling interest in ending discrimination 
against gay men and lesbians. Although not blindly deferring to the 
legislative materials, Judge Mack's opiµion is exemplary in its careful 
attention to the precise values the legislature was trying to protect (her 
exhaustive analysis of the legislative history) and in its critical ap-
proach to those values (her scrutiny of the legislature's reasons for 
protecting gay men and lesbians against discrimination). On the other 
hand, Judge Mack's opinion fails to subject Georgetown's values (the 
Catholic Church's rejection of homosexuality) to the same critical 
scrutiny. 144 
Finally, and not least, Judge Mack's opinion confronts the problem 
of colliding and conflicting norms, a problem highlighted but not 
"solved" in New Public Law articles. 145 Two judges dissented from 
her constitutional concerns that Georgetown not be compelled to "en-
dorse" an organization repugnant to its religious principles, 146 and two 
other judges dissented from her failure to press Georgetown's free ex-
ercise claim against providing facilities for such an organization. 147 
Judge Mack deals with these colliding norms through a critical analy-
sis of their traditions and a careful attention to how much each would 
be compromised by different interpretations. Interpreting the Human 
Rights Act to compel Georgetown, a Catholic university, to "endorse" 
student groups of which it disapproves, would go to the crux of the 
school's religious orientation and implicates freedom of speech con-
cerns as well. 148 This is met by Judge Ferren's argument that univer-
sity "recognition" of gay and lesbian student groups is not the same as 
143. 536 A.2d at 42 (Newman, J., concurring). 
144. 536 A.2d at 36 (opinion of Mack, J.); see 536 A.2d at 33-38. In this regard, Judge 
Ferren's partially dissenting opinion is a better example of New Public Law. 536 A.2d at 46-62 
(Ferren, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). But even Judge Ferren's 
opinion fails to grapple with the complex substantive issue of the reasons why the Catholic 
Church disapproves of homosexuality. See J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, 
AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESfERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 
CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980). 
145. Eskridge, supra note 134, at 1073-91; Sunstein, supra note 134, at 497-502. 
146. 536 A.2d at 49-54 (Ferren, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). 
We find the views expressed by Judge Ferren to be quite attractive on the merits. 
147. 536 A.2d at 67-74 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
148. 536 A.2d at 21-26 (opinion of Mack, J.). 
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university "endorsement" of their views.149 Judge Mack responds that 
Georgetown views recognition as endorsement, and that compelled 
recognition is a more direct attack on Georgetown's religious mission 
than requiring access to facilities, with less of a need by the student 
groups for such recognition.150 On the other hand, interpreting the 
Human Rights Act to compel Georgetown to provide gay and lesbian 
groups with access to facilities and benefits provides these groups with 
tangible means to assert their identities and views, while presenting a 
less direct affront to the university's religious mission. 
2. Colliding Norms in Public Law 
Probably the most difficult problem in public law is how to deal 
with conflicting and colliding norms. The constitutional issue in Gay 
Rights Coalition is whether Judge Mack's interpretation of the statute 
unconstitutionally burdens Georgetown's free exercise of religion. As 
her opinion makes clear, that pits free exercise norms pressed by 
Georgetown against the antidiscrimination norm pressed by the gay 
and lesbian students.151 A major challenge faced by the New Public 
Law is to develop practical reasoning for dealing with colliding norms. 
The traditions of hermeneutics and republicanism confront this chal-
lenge, as does an emerging New Public Law literature drawing from 
feminism 152 and pragmatism.153 
Two articles in this genre are Suzanna Sherry's "Civic Virtue and 
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication"154 and Margaret 
Jane Radin's "The Pragmatist and the Feminist."155 Applying in-
sights from feminist theory and (in Radin's article) complementary 
149. 536 A.2d at 51-52 (Ferren, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). 
Judge Ferren also engages in an interesting battle of analogies with Judge Mack. He argues that 
her interpretation creates a "separate but equal" regime of student organizations at Georgetown 
that would be objectionable if applied to racial groups, obviously invoking the negative example 
of Plessy. 536 A.2d at 49-50. Judge Mack argues that his interpretation would cut off the ability 
of a Gay University of America to create a community of interpretation. 536 A.2d at 25-26 
(opinion of Mack, J.). 
150. 536 A.2d at 19-20 (opinion of Mack, J.). But see 536 A.2d at 52 n.9 (Ferren, J., concur-
ring in the result in part and dissenting in part). 
151. 536 A.2d at 30-38 (opinion of Mack, J.). 
152. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 55; Minow, supra note 55; West, Feminism, Criti-
cal Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59. 
153. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 15; Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Consti-
tution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 
787 (1989); Patterson, supra note 116; Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 
781 (1989); Singer, Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy? (Book Review), 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1752; Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism and Will, 66 
IND. L.J. 1 (1990). 
154. Sherry, supra note 53. 
155. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990). 
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insights from pragmatist theory, these articles argue a commitment 
toward legal decisionmaking that emphasizes situatedness and context 
instead of universals and abstractions; reconciliation and accommoda-
tion instead of conflict and rights; and community instead of auton-
omy.156 The perspective suggested by Sherry and Radin is important 
to Judge Mack's opinion and to her treatment of colliding norms, and 
Sherry (at least) would find it significant that Judge Mack is a woman 
(the only woman on the seven-judge bench). Their perspective sug-
gests several features to Judge Mack's practical resolution of colliding 
norms, namely, (1) its focus on group needs and interests rather than 
individual rights, (2) its sensitivity to the voice of the dispossessed, and 
(3) its effort to reconcile rather than to separate. 
Sherry outlines a feminist jurisprudential framework that illumi-
nates the contrast between Judge Mack's approach and that of her 
colleagues.157 Traditional, male-oriented Anglo-American jurispru-
dence has assumed the primacy of atomistic individuals whose auton-
omy is protected by the enforcement of constitutional "rights," either 
through transcendental bright-line rules or utilitarian balancing tests. 
Sherry contrasts traditional jurisprudence with that of the republican 
tradition, and with that suggested by modern feminist scholarship. 
Feminist jurisprudence starts with the primacy of the community and 
of groups within the larger community, and situates individuals not as 
autonomous but as connected with one another, and with a variety of 
communities. This perspective more readily recognizes constitutional 
disputes as an opportunity to deal with norms in collision. Constitu-
tional decisionmaking therefore is not rule-based, rights-based, or util-
itarian balancing. It is not abstract, neutral, or hierarchal - it is 
instead concrete and situated, engaged, and web-Iike.158 
The Gay Rights Coalition opinions reveal a virtually complete ar-
ray of approaches to constitutional adjudication. The dissenting 
judges all speak in the argot of "rights" and "balancing" of those 
rights (as oxymoronic as this sounds). In contrast, Judge Mack fo-
cuses on community and group needs and interests, as reflected in the 
language of her opinion: rather than speaking of the "violation" of 
Georgetown's free exercise "rights," as her dissenting brethren do, 159 
156. Id. at 1707 (similarities of feminism and pragmatism); Sherry, supra note 53, at 580-91 
(similarities of feminism and republicanism). 
157. Sherry, supra note 53, at 548-49, 582; see id. at 542·613 (applying framework to Justice 
O'Connor's early record). 
158. Radin, supra note 155, at 1712-19, however, cautions against overgeneralization. 
159. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 67-74 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (repeated focus on Georgetown's "rights," the terribleness o( community "compulsion"); 
526 A.2d at 75 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (similar). 
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Judge Mack discusses the "burden ... on Georgetown's religious exer-
cise," and the "interest" of the larger community in eliminating dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.160 
In treating the colliding norms - the free exercise burden and the 
antidiscrimination policy - Judge Mack's opinion contrasts with both 
her concurring and dissenting brethren. In analyzing the District's 
antidiscrimination interest, Judge Mack not only examines the legisla-
tive materials, but subjects them to historicist scrutiny which strength-
ens the public need for the District's effort to eliminate discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.161 In effect, what she does is expand 
upon the legislative history to incorporate information about the 
nonvolitional nature of homosexuality, the vicious persecution of gay 
men and lesbians, and the ways in which that persecution demeans the 
community. Strikingly, this analysis draws disagreement from con-
curring Judge Newman. He argues for simple deference to the Dis-
trict's stated policy of nondiscrimination, based upon the traditional 
legal process notion that courts cannot sit as "super-legislatures to di-
vine the importance of governmental interests,"162 and must instead 
hue to " 'what are surely the main qualities of law, its generality and 
its neutrality.' " 163 Under Sherry's analysis, these traditional male-ori-
ented qualities of deference and hierarchy, generality and neutrality, 
might be usefully abandoned for an approach that is openly engaged 
and normative, concrete and political. 
The dissenting judges sharply disagree with Judge Mack's willing-
ness to consider protection of gay men and lesbians as a truly compel-
ling governmental interest. Indeed, dissenting Judge Nebeker finds 
that "no factor favoring a state interest under the Act which can be 
balanced against Georgetown's rights," because the "conduct inherent 
in homosexual 'life-style' is felonious" and entitled to no weight in the 
constitutional balance.164 To make his point, Judge Nebeker attaches 
three pictorial examples of "propaganda used to announce dances and 
gatherings" among gay and lesbian students at George Washington 
University. 165 
Radin's article helps explain the striking differences among Judges 
Mack, Newman, and Nebeker on the issue of how to treat the interests 
of gay men and lesbians. Radin criticizes traditional jurisprudence for 
160. 536 A.2d at 30-39 (opinion of Mack, J.). 
161. 536 A.2d at 31-38. 
162. 536 A.2d at 41 (Newman, J., concurring). 
163. 536 A.2d at 43 (quoting Wechsler, 'supra note 2, at 16). 
164. 536 A.2d at 75 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165. 536 A.2d at 75-78. 
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its complacency and its failure to understand "the perspective of the 
oppressed."166 In part because women have directly experienced so-
cial domination and false consciousness, feminist thought has been un-
usually sensitive to the perspective of the oppressed. In contrast to 
Judge Nebeker, who writes from the perspective of traditional preju-
dice, and Judge Newman, who writes from the perspective of a status 
quo-oriented legal process, Judge Mack, a woman, makes an eloquent 
case for treating gay men and lesbians with equal respect, and for criti-
cizing discrimination against them. Radin's article suggests that 
Judge Mack's extensive analysis of homosexuality in a heterosexual 
world is an effort to liberate us from a false consciousness. 
A final feminist theme important to New Public Law practical rea-
soning is that of approaching conflicts from a different angle, and seek-
ing reconciliation rather than just adopting a win/lose posture. 167 
Although many feminist scholars such as Radin do not believe that 
women inherently approach problem-solving in a completely different 
way from men, 168 this theme may provide insight into Judge Mack's 
opinion. The parties posed the issues in the lawsuit in starkly dichoto-
mous, win/lose terms: either Georgetown was required to recognize 
the gay and lesbian student groups or it was not. This posing of the 
issue sharpened the conflict between the norms in the case. Over the 
strong objection of some of her colleagues,169 Judge Mack refused to 
look at the issue in this simple way, and bifurcated the issue into a 
recognition/endorsement feature and an access-to-facilities feature. 
Analytically, this move enabled Judge Mack to save the Human 
Rights Act from serious constitutional difficulty, while still giving ef-
fect to its core policy. Practically, this move enabled Judge Mack to 
offer a result that accommodated the most significant needs of both 
groups: The gay and lesbian student groups received access to facili-
ties and benefits needed to provide support for students, and George-
town was able to preserve its integrity as a Catholic institution. 
3. Reconciliation, Freedom, and Community 
New Public Law practical reasoning draws from hermeneutics, re-
publicanism, feminism, and pragmatism, as developed above. We 
have seen how Gay Rights Coalition involves normative decisionmak-
166. Radin, supra note 155, at 1711; see also Brewer, Pragmatism, Oppression and the Flight 
to Substance, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1753 (1990). 
167. This is a theme of Carol Gilligan, c. GILLIGAN, IN A DlFFERENTVOICE: PSYCHOLOG· 
ICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
168. Radin, supra note 155, at 1712-19. 
169. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 48 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); 536 A.2d at 62-63 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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ing in its statutory as much as its constitutional interpretation, and 
how the New Public Law might treat the colliding norms in that case 
- seeking accommodation and reconciliation instead of creating a 
sharp win/lose hierarchy. What remains is to connect this project 
with a political/ constitutional theory of judging. That has been the 
work of Frank Michelman, whose articles on "Traces of Self-Govem-
ment"170 and "Law's Republic"171 relate themes from republicanism, 
feminism, critical race theory, gay-law, law and religion, hermeneu-
tics, and pragmatism to a political theory outlining the role of the 
judge. 
Like the late Robert Cover, whom he invokes, Michelman laments 
the "jurispathic" role of authoritarian judging, exemplified by the dis-
senting opinions in Gay Rights Coalition. 172 At least two different 
communities of interpretation were on a collision course in that case 
- Georgetown University, whose Catholic tradition morally disap-
proves of homosexual relations, and the gay and lesbian student 
groups, which were part of a larger struggle to transform traditional 
oppression of gay men and lesbians. The parties to the lawsuit, and 
most of the judges, saw the case in traditional terms, in which the 
court would "kill" the position of one side or the other by choosing its 
interpretation of the "law." Judge Nebeker, most starkly, was com-
mitted to suppressing the gay and lesbian community, in a violent and 
assaultive dissenting opinion.173 Though far less assaultive, Judge Per-
ren's opinion argued strongly for overriding all of Georgetown's free 
exercise claims, subordinating them entirely to the claims of the gay 
and lesbian student groups. 174 Both of these judges saw their role as 
jurispathic - killing the genuine needs of a vibrant (but to each objec-
tionable) community of interpretation, under the aegis of "law's 
empire." 175 
Michelman argues against authoritarian judging, because it exacer-
bates the tension between our constitutional ideals of self-government 
and government of laws.176 By taking an imperial stance that exer-
cises a nonmajoritarian dominion over one of the two communities, 
the authoritarian judge is denying freedom to one of the communities 
170. Michelman, supra note 53. 
171. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
172. Michelman, supra note 53, at 133 (invoking Cover, supra note 54. 
173. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 75-78 (Nebeker, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (according no legal interest in protecting gay men and lesbians and branding all homo-
sexuals as "criminal[s]"). 
174. 536 A.2d at 46-62. 
175. See Michelman, supra note 53, at 66-73. 
176. Michelman, supra note 171. 
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to set its own norms, and thereby abridging that community's citizen-
ship, its part in self-govemment. 177 Given the assumptions of our plu-
ralism, authoritarian judging and law's empire will undermine self-
govemance. Set against this vision is Michelman's vision of "law's 
republic," in which the judge's role is "jurisgenerative" (Cover's term) 
- offering reconciliation and opportunities for a "dissolution of differ-
ence" between clashing communities.178 Only by redefining the prob-
lem or offering opportunities for the transformation of preferences, or 
both, can the judge - and our polity - protect the self-government 
and citizenship of the communities. This is true government of laws. 
As Michelman puts it, "certain characteristic themes" bind to-
gether the "reconciliatory project." In his words: 
The dia/ogic themes express the vision of social normative choice as 
participatory, exploratory, and persuasive, rather than specialized, de-
ductive, or demonstrative. They emphasize openness to "otherness" as a 
way toward recognition not only of the other but also of oneself. 
The historical themes express the sense that the conversation neither 
begins nor ends now. We have individual pasts and a collective past, and 
those pasts raise for us issues of identity and integrity. At the same time 
we have, we hope, our individual and collective futures, and our conver-
sation now ought not to foreclose future conversations. 
The responsibility themes express demands for both clear-sightedness 
and personal engagement. They warn against the comforts of legal ab-
straction, hiding or overlooking actualities of social disadvantage. They 
protest against projection of the agency of decision onto a distant force 
- such as law or state - when the truth is that their distance is what we 
make it by our deference. 
The identity themes reflect the tug between the demands for both eth-
ical situation and personal "space" as dual conditions of freedom. They 
also point most obviously towards the irresolvable tension between gen-
erality and particularity that pervades the reconciliatory enterprise as a 
whole.179 
Judge Mack's opinion in Gay Rights Coalition takes seriously the re-
sponsibility of the judge to be open to perspectives of others, particu-
larly those who have been excluded from citizenship. 
Michelman's articles suggest an explanation and justification for 
Judge Mack's "compromise" decision. It was an overture for the par-
ties to join in a modus vivendi, a shared community that over time 
177. Thus, Judges Nebeker and Belson undermine the freedom of the gay and lesbian stu-
dents, 536 A.2d at 62-78, and Judges Ferren and Terry undermine the freedom of Georgetown 
University. 536 A. 2d at 46-62. Judge Newman under this analysis tends to deny self-govern· 
ance of both groups in his deferential refusal to examine the norms chosen by the legislature. 536 
A.2d at 40-46. 
178. Michelman, supra note 171, at 1526-27; Michelman, supra note 53, at 31-33. 
179. Michelman, supra note 53, at 33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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could ameliorate their normative differences in ways that a judicial 
decree cannot. As compromises often do, this was immediately disap-
pointing to both parties; but in the longer term this is not necessarily 
the case. As law professors at Georgetown University Law Center, we 
think that the university community is better off because of the activi-
ties of the gay and lesbian student groups, and that the University 
itself has a more productive approach to gay and lesbian students be-
cause of its relationship with these groups. One of us (Eskridge) is 
also an adviser to the gay and lesbian student group at the Law 
Center, and b,elieves that gay and lesbian students are less alienated 
from the educational experience because of the more constructive ap-
proach taken by the University, and that the gay and lesbian student 
group has become an important part of the academic community. To 
that extent, Judge Mack's compromise has been ajurisgenerative expe-
rience. On the other hand, the compromise has left gay and lesbian 
student groups as the only ones which must publicly (and repeatedly) 
present themselves as not reflecting the values of Georgetown Univer-
sity. To that extent, Judge Mack's compromise has left the gay and 
lesbian groups permanently stigmatized. 
III. THE NEW PUBLIC LAW AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The New Public Law encompasses particular aspects of a changing 
conception of dominant American legal institutions. We have 
grouped together the recent work of Frank Michelman, Harold Mc-
Dougall, Cass Sunstein, William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, Philip 
Frickey, Suzanna Sherry, Martha Minow, Ed Rubin, Cynthia Farina, 
and others. We sense that there is something similar about the move 
to "republicanism" in constitutional interpretation, the embrace of 
"public values" and "hermeneutics" in statutory interpretation, the in-
sistence on stricter judicial review of administrative action, the recon-
ceptualization of the law /politics and reason/passion distinctions in 
terms of law's "practical reason," the embrace of a particular form of 
feminist thought, and the assertion of "perspectivalism" and the com-
mitment to cultural "diversity" in political theory. It is not that all of 
these aspects of recent scholarship are necessarily linked through a 
shared adherence to a set of philosophical premises. Instead, this 
work constitutes a genre of legal thought. The body of work hangs 
together like an artistic style might, even though each manifestation 
might be very different. The shared attributes are tonal and attitudi-
nal; they appear as pieces of a general cultural tum in our intellectual 
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context recognizable largely for not being something else, such as law 
and economics or CLS. 
This article has taken as its main project the depiction of the New 
Public Law as a genre of legal scholarship. In the first two Parts, we 
related the work to the dominant discourse of American legal theory 
for the past thirty years, the legal process synthesis of the 1950s. The 
New Public Law scholarship both continues and dramatically reforms 
the legal process approach. 
The recent public law work shares with the legal process tradition 
the central idea that justice resides in process - that legal analysis 
should describe particular procedures for reaching decisions about the 
terms of social life. Thus the scholarship focuses on deliberation, 
practical reason, regulatory failure, factionalism, and dialogue. To put 
this another way, the agenda continues to be set by the intellectual 
taxonomy of the legal process approach: the central question is 
whether the process of decisionmaking has been legitimate. For exam-
ple, part of the rhetorical force of Frank Michelman's "Traces" arti-
cle180 lies in the use of Justice O'Connor's opinion as the exemplar of 
decisionmaking, even though it is obvious that Michelman and Justice 
O'Connor have deep ideological differences. Procedure is thus sepa-
rate from politics; the mode of engagement, contextualization, and re-
sponsibility that Michelman encourages in Justice O'Connor's 
approach can legitimate an exercise of power separate from its sub-
stantive ideology. 
But this new generation of scholars has also reformed the legal 
process synthesis through a new emphasis on what we have called 
"normativity." We use this term to refer to a conviction that no issues 
are simply "procedural," and thus no institution may ever simply de-
fer to the substantive decisions of another institution. There is some 
real tension between these two aspects of the New Public Law scholar-
ship; the direction of reform seems to undermine the basic, historical 
justification for the adoption of the legal process analytic itself. If we 
are right that the turn to proceduralism was at least in part occasioned 
by the corrosive legal realist attack on the intellectual coherence of a 
neutral and objective regime of substantive law, 181 then it is at first 
glance odd that ;New Public Law scholars would preserve the focus on 
process within a practice that proclaims itself openly normative. 
In this Part, we address the tension we see within the New Public 
Law scholarship - between an attraction to proceduralism and never-
180. See supra notes 170-179 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
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theless a conviction that all decisionmaking is ultimately normative -
by situating the movement in the ideological and intellectual context 
of legal scholarship in the 1980s. In addition to comparing this new 
work to the legal process tradition, it is also important to see the New 
Public Law scholarship as a reaction to the politicization of legal 
scholarship that began in the late 1970s and that was overt by the 
1980s. This period included the rise of an explicitly leftist CLS move-
ment, 182 the development of right-wing and moderate versions of law 
and economics, 183 the founding of a feminist legal movement with its 
own liberal and radical factions, 184 and, by the end of the 1980s, the 
orgalifzation of a distinctly left-leaning cadre of scholars of color.185 
And all this occurred in the context of the simultaneous disintegration 
of an intellectual or ideological "center," of some perspective that 
could claim to be the position of the "true professionals," and against 
which all these other factions would appear deviant.186 
We believe that New Public Law scholars are constructing their 
discourse in part in the desire to resolve the sense of conflict and disin-
tegration in legal academic culture. These scholars aim to articulate a 
new consensus position that could take account of the "partial truths" 
of the extant intellectual factions while transcending them all in favor 
of a new synthesis. Ironically, in this dimension, the New Public Law 
scholarship is similar to the legal process thinkers of the 1950s; both 
182. For various accounts, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); 
R. UNGER, THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Boyle, The Politics of Reason: 
Critical Legal Studies and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985); Note, 'Round 
and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669 (1983). For collections of CLS essays, see CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES (A. Hutchinson 
ed. 1989); THE PoLmcs OF LAW, supra note 5; Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. (1984); A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 AM. U. L. REv. (1985). 
183. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 49; G. CALABRESI, 
supra note 49; A. POLINSKY, INTRODUCTION TO LA w AND EcONOMICS (1983); c. GOETZ, LAW 
AND EcONOMICS (1984). 
184. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 116; Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Con-
tract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L. REv. 
1497 (1983); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85). 
185. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297 (1987) (series of articles); Cook, supra note 
54; Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformations and Legitimations in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Torres & Milun, Translating 
Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625; Wil-
liams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 
2128 (1989). 
186. For a short time, it seemed that an updated legal process analytic - updated to account 
for Brown v. Board Of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and issues of racial, gender and sexual 
justice - could play this role, or that some ACLU-type rights discourse would become the 
default position for defining reasonableness in legal scholarship. That has not occurred. 
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embody the attempt to mediate the ideological polarization of legal 
discourse. We conclude this section with the observation that the New 
Public Law is one manifestation of a cultural current in American life 
that can best be understood as a reaction of "centrism," a desire to 
avoid conflict and difference by locating a position between perceived 
"extremes." 
One aspect of our view of the New Public Law as a centrist media-
tion derives from the sense that much of the New Public Law genre 
resonates with ideas and intellectual perspectives that, very recently, 
were considered "radical" and were associated almost exclusively with 
the work of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. Although 
within the New Public Law group there are roughly identifiable con-
servative and liberal ideological groups, the movement as a whole has 
a progressive tone. If we are right that the New Public Law consti-
tutes a new center for legal scholarship, it is nevertheless well to the 
left of what had been the center for previous generations of legal aca-
demics. One aspect of this is the embrace of Brown and the ideals of 
racial and gender justice as fundamental to the view of law. Another 
is the extent to which opposition to the law-and-economics movement 
establishes common intellectual ground with leftist intellectuals who 
have most fully engaged and criticized the reigning economic ap-
proaches to law. 
In this section, we explicate the congruence between many ideas of 
the New Public Law scholarship and CLS work, which underlie the 
sense of a left tilt to the New Public Law scholarship. Both can be 
understood as movements putting at the center of their intellectual 
agenda a critique of positivism. 
Part of the reason that the New Public Law scholarship sounds 
tilted to the left lies in its self-conscious adoption of the critique of 
positivism that is similar to the critique CLS writers have often 
adopted and arguably in tum appropriated from critical realist work. 
But we also believe that the critique of positivism has meant different 
things for different intellectuals - those adopting antipositivism need 
not embrace an oppositionist view of social relations. Indeed, the New 
Public Law scholars deradicalize the left's intellectual discourse even 
as they embrace it. Part of understanding the New Public Law as a 
centrist movement involves comprehending the political transforma-
tion that radical ideas about interpretative indeterminacy and the so-
cial construction of reality have undergone recently as they have been 
utilized by a new scholarly genre. 
February 1991] New Public Law 765 
A. Intellectual Politics and the Issue of Positivism 
One way of approaching twentieth-century American legal 
thought is to see it as a series of conflicts over the possibility of an 
objective, determinate representation of social events - as intellectual 
skirmishes between positivist and antipositivist ideologies. We use 
"antipositivist" to suggest that the key jurisprudential conflict is not 
organized around the poles of positivism and natural law, as conven-
tionally conceived.187 Rather, the key conflict is between positivism 
and the assertion of the inevitability of interpretation - that is, the 
"indeterminacy" position. From this viewpoint, positivist and natural 
law jurisprudences do not stand as opposites, but rather share the 
characteristic of being "objectivist"188 or, in Richard Rorty's terms, 
"foundationalist."189 In our terms, they are both instances of a more 
general form of positivism, understood as an interpretative mode that 
poses a qualitative dichotomy between the act of interpretation and 
the object of interpretation. Such a mode must assume the interpreta-
tive act can be governed by and checked against the positive content of 
some objective reality that exists separate from the interpretation it-
self.190 What makes the New Public Law actually new, compared to 
the legal process tradition, is that New Public Law scholars have made 
antipositivism central to their epistemological, methodological, and 
substantive positions. This antipositivism also characterizes much of 
the work of CLS, leading to our conclusion that, in terms of intellec-
tual positions, CLS and at least the progressive wing of New Public 
Law share a great deal of ground.191 
187. Morton Horwitz suggests that the incessant understanding of American jurisprudential 
conflict as dividing around positivism and natural law may be due to a certain winner's history, 
through which the realists' false claims that the sins of the liberty of contract era were based on 
their adoption of natural law have since been adopted in mainstream discourse. Horwitz, Repub-
licanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. RE.v. 57, 73-
74 (1987). 
188. R. UNGER, supra note 182, at 3. 
189. R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). 
190. The key here is to grasp that the "objective reality" can be either the traditional "empir-
ical facts" of positivism in its modem, scientific dimension, or the a priori possibilities of reflec-
tion and contemplation in the natural law tradition. See Peller, supra note 5, at 1160-76 (linking 
theories of determinate representations as elements of a generalized metaphysics of presence, or 
of "positivism"). 
191. As we evaluate New Public Law scholarship here, what separates it from the legal pro-
cess tradition is the rejection of liberal images of representation as an objective process. We 
believe that divisions within the body of New Public Law work can be understood on the same 
axis - more progressive, left-leaning work, like that of Frank Michelman, see supra notes 170-79 
and accompanying text, is marked by the tendency toward more and more thoroughgoing anti-
positivist premises. In contrast, the conservative wing of New Public Law, say, the work of 
Jonathan Macey, see supra note 85, tends to employ positivist methodologies like public choice 
theory, albeit within the umbrella of New Public Law because they are in service of a critique of 
structural problems of institutional decisionmaking. 
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As we see it, the issue of positivism has served as an ideological 
marker to divide progressive and conservative intellectual approaches, 
both in legal thought and in intellectual life generally. Although this 
structure of associations is not predetermined, it is as if, in the intellec-
tual arena, some version of the rules/standards, science/art, founda-
tionalist/antifoundationalist polarities formed a discourse around 
which positivism was being contested in various dimensions, all 
loosely referred back to the epistemological issue of truth as represen-
tation. The connection between positivism in social science, in episte-
mological assumptions, and in legal thought was vague at best. Some 
aspect of it is captured by an image of hardheadedness opposed to 
fancy but unrealistic theorizing, an image of a dichotomy between 
facts opposed to values, and the confidence in a sure marker for telling 
which was which. In a sense, various oppositions to positivist ideology 
were linked together, as discourses linking freedom and indeterminacy 
against constraint within the epistemological arena. This association 
seemed to assert itself even within what otherwise seemed like qualita-
tively different theoretical perspectives. Alvin Gouldner's depiction of 
the battle between scientific and critical Marxisms demonstrated the 
overlay of the issue of positivist methodology and left/right politics by 
showing the issue divided the left internally.192 Marcuse straightfor-
wardly associated positivism with fascism. 193 Within the Western left 
intellectual world, the critique of positivism served as one of the ways 
the left understood itself opposed to the centralized mockeries of pop-
ular control in the "Marxist" world. Thus the American New Left 
generally, like "European" or "humanist" marxists with whom they 
associated, rejected the scientistic, positivist aspirations of Marxism 
and made the critique of positivism the dividing line for disassociating 
from the large scale "socialist" regimes and ideology of the eastern 
bloc.194 The antipositivist characteristics of CLS work bear the marks 
of engagement with this recent intellectual history on the left. 
B. The Realists as Antipositivists 
At one level, the realists focused their attack on the liberty of con-
tract ideology on the issue of representation. The common law judici-
ary's image of the liberty of contract as merely facilitative rested upon 
the assumption that the court could neutrally and determinately re-
present the act of will or consent with which the party obligated him-
192. A. GOULDNER, THE Two MARXISMS (1980). 
193. H. MARcusE, REASON OR REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1955). 
194. See M. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 84-92 (C. Gordon ed. 
1980) (criticizing aspiration to make Marxism a science). 
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self to the contract. Thus, not only did the liberty of contract ap-
proach depend on an image of a sharp dichotomy between the public 
and private realms - such that it was coherent to talk about a "pri-
vate" decision free from public regulation - but it also depended on 
the idea that such a prior, private, and subjective moment could be 
faithfully re-presented at a later time by the court, as the basis for the 
legitimate imposition of legal duties. 195 In this deep connection be-
tween the idea of a private will and the need to re-present that will 
publicly, from the outside, the common law formalists placed the ob-
jective theory of contracts. From this perspective, the objective theory 
plays the same role (with the same problematics) in private law that 
clear statement rules and other canons of interpretation play in tradi-
tional public law. They are attempts to objectify the practice of repre-
sentation by the invocation of predetermined meanings that the 
relevant party is deemed to know. Simultaneously, this invocation 
serves to put the act of interpretation itself on a nondiscretionary 
basis. 
Of course, there is an anomaly here: how can public, predeter-
mined rules of construction hope to capture and reproduce what is 
posited as a unique event? That anomaly, reflecting the twin objec-
tives of the ideology of liberal individualism both to represent private 
will, subjectivity, and yet to do so through law, on an objective and 
nondiscretionary basis, gives rise to the continuing dialectic about rep-
resentation that is one preoccupation of twentieth-century American 
legal thought. 
The commitment to protecting a sphere of subjective choice 
(whether that sphere is located in the individual or in the legislature) 
can be carried out in two paradigmatic forms, each of which is unsatis-
factory. On the one hand, rules might be developed to govern the 
representational process, but as objective, pregiven rules, they are nec-
essarily external to what is to be represented. On the other hand, a 
purposive or functional approach to interpretation may promise more 
sensitivity to the particularities of context and event, but at the ex-
pense of objectivity and determinacy, and thus may be vulnerable to 
the charge that it is not law at all.196 
The realist attack on the liberty of contract approach can exploited 
this dimension of the problem of representation. The argument reap-
195. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 5, at 1728-
31, 1754-56; Peller, The Classical Theory of Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 300 (1988); Peller, supra 
note 5, at 1193-219. 
196. For the exemplary study of the ideology of these modes of interpretation, see Kennedy, 
supra note 195. 
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pears repeatedly in realist writings on contract law that the individual-
ist pretensions of liberty of contract approaches were belied by the 
utilization of the objective theory of contracts.197 Rather than re-
presenting a prior act of consent, the objective theory of contracts nec-
essarily constructed that will for social purposes.198 As Holmes said, 
the finding of contractual obligation rested on the congruence of exter-
nal, formal signs, not on any internal will of the parties.199 Of course, 
that was only one aspect of the realist critique - but the rest of the 
realist attack revolved around a similar skepticism about the possibil-
ity of representation, a continual argument that the interpreter was 
constructing what she purported merely to represent. 
This critique of representation had fairly direct and familiar impli-
cations for the substantive liberal political theory that underlay the 
liberty of contract approach. The inevitable indeterminacy involved in 
representing individual will reappeared in the more general critique of 
the neutrality and objectivity of common law doctrine that formed the 
"private" law of contract, tort, and property. A sharp distinction be-
tween the public and private realms was impossible because, in the 
very act of carving out the "private" domain, "public" policy neces-
sarily interceded. Without any possibility of directly representing the 
market or individual will, both were necessarily socially constructed. 
Or, in other words, the doctrinal apparatus of the liberty of contract 
era constituted a particular form of social regulation, not the protec-
tion of the private realm from public intervention that the Lochner 
Court asserted. 
Of course, on at least one interpretation, it seems strained to call 
the realists antipositivists. A significant strand of realist work clearly 
was positivist - the idea of law as prediction of official action con-
tained in Holmes' "bad man" view of law,200 the separation of fact 
from values, 201 and the implication in much realist work that, 
although law inevitably involved questions of public policy, policy 
197. A description of this aspect of realist scholarship is contained in Peller, supra note 5, at 
1195-218. 
198. Given the simplicity of this critique, one might well wonder how the liberty of contract 
theorists could have embraced the objective theory of contracts at all. It seems to us that the best 
explanation is that the objective theory of contracts was expected to mediate between private will 
and public interpretation through an image of objective standards of interpretation as elements of 
freely chosen and privately developing custom, reflecting the aggregate of individual decisions at 
any moment. Similarly, a negligence standard of reasonableness could cohere with an overriding 
individualistic legal theory on the same basis. See M. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in 
American Legal Thought (unpublished manuscript on file with authors). 
199. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897). 
200. Id. at 458. 
201. See Singer, Legal Realism Now, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988). 
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analysis was itself objective and determinate - and hence lawyers 
could be understood as "policy scientists. "202 In terms of this strand 
of realist scholarship, the idea that immanent social purposes could be 
identified and carried forth from the social field itself, or that predic-
tion could represent objective factors upon which official behavior 
rested, constituted new claims of positive, objective representations. 
On this read, the realists turned the liberty of contract approach on its 
head: what was critical to represent was not the private subject, but 
the public, objective context - that is, more "facts." 
C. Procedural Representation 
The legal process thinkers of the 1950s articulated the distinction 
between law and politics through the mediation of substantive plural-
ism on the one hand, and procedural determinacy, itself heavily de-
pendent on the objectivity of representation, on the other. In their 
view, heeding the deep antipositivism of the realist critique would 
make the idea of being ruled by law incoherent. Yet the technocratic 
implications of the realist constructive program seemed inconsistent 
with the need for democracy at all. The response was typically relativ-
ist and inclusionary. Law was both the qualitative principles of com-
mon law formalism and the quantitative policies of regulatory science. 
Some realms were best left to expert resolution, others to reasoned 
elaboration - the pragmatic weaving together of principles and poli-
cies that defined the special judicial competence - and still others to 
resolution by the open-ended discretion of democratic choice. And 
the ultimate decision of which was which would be traced back to the 
popular will, in_sofar as other institutions acted as deputy legislators, to 
represent the absent legislature. In other words, the modernist prag-
matism and indeterminacy were both embraced and constrained to is-
sues of substantive law; "reasoned elaboration" was not meant to 
suggest any positive, predictable result in particular cases, because 
substantive doctrine had to be understood purposively, that is, in anti-
positivist fashion. 
In Warshow, then, the movement from the majority's insistence 
that the nuclear protesters had not shown imminence to the proce-
dural discourse of the dissent and concurrence was the background 
idea that, whatever else might make sense, imminence as a substantive, 
formal limit to the necessity defense did not. Thus, implicit in the 
202. Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal went the furthest in the attempt to develop this 
idea, see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the 
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943), although much of the New Deal ideology of expert 
regulation might be traced to it as well. 
770 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:707 
dissent and concurrence was the idea that a certain harm of small pro-
portions was at least comparable to a small (but rationally unaccept-
able) risk of immense harm symbolized by the language of meltdown, 
unless you were prepared to take formalism quite far indeed. And 
once you abandon formalism for a purposive approach, you really do 
start wondering exactly what the protestors were trying to communi-
cate before you excluded it as "irrelevant." But the legitimating 
ground for such an open-ended doctrinal approach was a procedural 
vision that made representation central to legitimacy. 
The key assumption of the process approach, echoing the relativist 
defense of democracy in political theory, was that the indeterminacy 
of substantive questions was not all that subversive because substan-
tive questions always were subject to legislative resolution. And the 
critical aspect of legislative resolution was the implication that the leg-
islature "represented" the popular will. On this fulcrum, the image of 
common law courts and administrative agencies as "deputy legisla-
tures," legislating "interstitially" and subject to legislative correction, 
links together with the reigning constitutional law idea of the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty." Both acquired their particular mean-
ing in reference to a legislature that ruled by virtue of its democratic 
character, that is, to the extent that it represented the popular will. 
More generally, under the principle of institutional settlement, the 
"special kind of ought" of law always depended on the ability to repre-
sent the conjunction of a particular kind of question with the particu-
lar procedure that ought to be employed to resolve that kind of 
question. For example, if what made administrative agency decisions 
legitimate was the legislature's delegation of authority to administra-
tive application of "expertise," then an agency decision must demon-
strate that expertise to the court if it is entitled to respect under the 
principle of institutional settlement. And because the possibility of ob-
jective representation was limited to institutional competence analysis, 
the bulk of process-oriented scholarship consisted of studies of institu-
tional interrelationships. The critical issue in such studies was always 
whether or not to defer to another institution's resolution of a substan-
tive issue because that institution's resolution "represented" the con-
gruence of a particular procedure and the kind of issue that procedure 
was rationally adapted to resolving.203 
Warshow was in this sense an exemplar case for process theory. In 
203. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930); H. HART & 
H. WECHSLER, supra note 2; H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968); Bator, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 16 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1963) . 
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Warshow, concurring Justice Hill's argument that the balancing of the 
risks and benefits of nuclear power had been accomplished in the dem-
ocratically chosen manner by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission re-
flected one highly formalist version of the possibilities for identifying 
institutional legitimacy. He did not even seem to care whether or not 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures had arguably failed 
in this particular licensing; he was willing to review the decision at the 
highly abstract level of whether or not nuclear power had been de-
cided to be worth its risks in general. 
The process synthesis was also its vulnerability, for its pluralist in-
clusion of form and function would soon bleed over from substance to 
process. Indeed, throughout the hegemony of process theory in the 
late 1950s and 1960s, one could fairly easily distinguish liberal from 
conservative process theorists based on whether they used a formal or 
purposive approach to the question of how to represent institutional 
legitimacy. In the example of an administrative agency, one could 
identify expertise in a rule-like, formal matter - did the deci-
sionmakers have appropriate degrees, did they spend time studying the 
issue - or in a functional way that moved closer and closer to having 
to reproduce the very substantive decision in order to determine 
whether or not expertise was exercised. In labor law, the issue was 
"does an employer bargain in good faith" - the procedure legitimat-
ing labor/management relations - when it simply meets with and ex-
changes words with union representatives, or must we look to the 
substantive question whether reasonable labor proposals were rejected 
without justification? But such a choice between formalist or func-
tionalist ways to identify legitimating procedures implied that the 
question of whether any particular institutional decision was entitled 
to respect itself was indeterminate, undercutting the logic of turning to 
proceduralism in the first place. 
In Warshow, the dissent showed the ultimate overlap between the 
substantive and procedural questions. Suppose the protestors were 
right, and starting up Vermont Yankee presented unreasonable risks 
of nuclear catastrophe, either slowly over time or all at once at some 
unspecified time. In that case, they necessarily claimed implicitly that 
the regulatory apparatus the "public" set up to ensure its safety had 
messed up tremendously. A necessity defense neatly countered both a 
substantive and proceduralist formalism once a purpose was given to 
public agency creation - what kind of public would set up an agency 
to approve unreasonably dangerous nuclear power plants? Every 
claim of unreasonable nuclear risks was automatically a claim of 
agency failure. The very logic of having a necessity defense - to sub-
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categorize the dictates of the general criminal law to exceptional con-
texts where the values protected by the general law are outweighed in 
particular circumstances - suggested conducting the institutional 
calculus in a nonformalist, contextualized way. 
While the indeterminacy of such concepts as "expertise" and 
"good faith bargaining" - to say nothing about "due process" - pro-
vided the organizing agenda for controversy among legal scholars 
within the process discourse, the key predicate to the whole approach 
- that the legislature represented the popular will - was itself simply 
assumed. The deep anomaly of the relativist theory of democracy, as 
well as the legal process reconstruction of law around it, was that rela-
tivism could just as easily invade the question whether or not a democ-
racy prevailed in the first place. The range of ways to "represent" 
legislative legitimacy could extend from formal, external signs, like the 
positive fact of voting and the obedience to the formal requirements of 
presentment and bicameralism, to a critical and substantive inquiry 
into the quality and experience of social freedom actually enjoyed in 
the society. The legal realist deconstruction of the idea that the com-
mon law represented individual consent could apply to the idea that 
the legislature represented popular will. Early process theorists 
avoided the anomaly by ignoring the issue altogether. 
John Hart Ely is a transitional figure in the development of the 
New Public Law because he opened the process discourse to the criti-
cal questioning of the democratic legitimacy of the legislature. This 
inquiry forms the starting point for understanding the more compli-
cated position that New Public Law adopts. Prior to Ely's work, 
scholars in constitutional law had simply assumed the predicate of the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty," that the legislature represented the 
popular will, and occupied themselves with the theoretic consequences 
of that starting point for judicial review. Ely in a sense perfected pro-
cess theory.204 He completed the general institutional competence sys-
tem by resting judicial review on the necessity to ensure that the 
legislature is truly representative, in much the same way that Hart and 
Sacks talked about judicial review of administrative decisions as neces-
sary to ensure that administrative decisions are supported by expertise. 
Ely's work, by neatly integrating Brown into the process analytic, vin-
dicated "liberal" process theorists for whom Wechsler's "Neutral 
Principles" argument had hung like a cloud over their work. 
But no sooner had Ely focused on the legitimacy of the legislature 
204. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Law -And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L. REV. 223, 
223 (1981). 
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than the conflict between a formalist or purposive mode of review im-
mediately represented itself. This conflict arose in the interstices of 
doctrinal questions such as the choice between a de jure or de facto 
approach to whether or not "discrete and insular minorities" had been 
burdened, or whether or not the state action doctrine made sense as a 
precondition of first amendment rights. Ely's key insight was that the 
same idea of legislative representation which formed the starting point 
of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" itself provided the task of ac-
tivist judicial review - to ensure that the legislature really did repre-
sent popular will (here understood in interest group pluralism terms). 
But once Ely centered the issue of representation, the choices between 
purposive and formalist approaches immediately reappeared. The rep-
resentation-reinforcing mode of judicial review could be conducted 
either on a formalist basis or through a more open-ended, and indeter-
minate, interpretation of whether or not American society was demo-
cratic. Given that the legislature did represent the popular will, a 
constrained, rule-like review would be in order to ensure that the judi-
ciary did not invade the competence of the legislature. Still, this con-
clusion could not be taken as a given, and thus utilized as a way to 
resolve whether or not to approach legislative legitimacy in rule or 
standard fashion, because it was the very question at issue. In scholar-
ship, the indeterminacy of representation of the category "democracy" 
was reflected in critical reviews of Ely that argued for alternative defi-
nitions of democracy.205 Moreover, some argued that deference to the 
legislature was problematic even when discrete and insular minorities 
were not at issue, because the legislature could not be assumed to rep-
resent the majority.206 
In antidiscrimination law, the question reappeared in the trenches 
of doctrinal debate over intent and impact tests; in first amendment 
law, over the state action doctrine. In each of the settings, Ely's own 
resolution of the issue of representationi appeared more and more for-
malist: limiting the inquiry to whether or not the state had acted to 
violate a checklist of democratic criteria provided in the Constitution 
(voting and free speech) seemed to beg the functional question 
whether or not, even apart from state action, discrete and insular mi-
norities or free speech rights were burdened. If the opportunity to 
exercise free speech rights was an empirical precondition to legislative 
legitimacy, the legislature could not be said to be democratic unless 
those opportunities actually existed. And after the realist assault on 
205. See Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); 
Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1981). 
206. Parker, supra note 204, at 246-59. 
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the public/private distinction, limiting the inquiry to the positive acts 
of the state seemed especially backward. The legislature's failure to 
act affirmatively arguably created legally enforced privileges on the 
part of shopping center owners to deny free speech opportunities. 
And yet, without the kind of limitations assumed by Ely, the represen-
tation-reinforcement would devolve into the kind of free-wheeling in-
quiry into social justice that the entire process approach assumed to be 
hopelessly indeterminate and value-laden. Process theory was at an 
intellectual dead-end. 
In any event, just as Ely seemed to perfect the process synthesis, 
the process approach itself had become a background and waning con-
ventionality. The politics of representation took the more explicit 
form of an opposition between objectivist and positivist law and eco-
nomics and the antipositivist critique in CLS. By the time that Ely 
successfully integrated legal process with the activism of the Warren 
Court, the heart of the legal process approach had passed from liberals 
like Lon Fuller and Henry Hart to conservatives like Paul Bator and 
Paul Mishkin. Instead of reflecting the constitutional activism of the 
Warren Court, the authoritative decisions reflected the deregulatory 
activism of the Burger Court. And the central process admonishment 
to defer to decisions under the principle of institutional settlement had ' 
assumed a broader, conservative cast as the underpinning of "estab-
lishment" objections to the confrontational protest and mass mobiliza-
tion tactics of progressives in the 1960s. For liberals who wanted to 
support Brown and the most progressive Warren Court decisions, 
Ely's own synthesis did little to relieve their sense of intellectual disin-
tegration and ideological isolation. 
D. Polarization 
As the "center" represented by process discourse waned, the plu-
ralist theoretical synthesis disintegrated back into its positivist and an-
tipositivist components. The ideological disagreements between the 
law and economics and CLS movements had many different dimen-
sions, including vast conflict over the legitimacy, definition, and coher-
ence of the private market and the role of law in the construction of 
social power. One overriding point of opposition was the dramatically 
divergent positions each movement symbolized with respect to the is-
sue of representation: it seemed like a localized battle neatly divided 
between "science" and "critical theory." 
The contrast was apparent early in the ways that each attacked the 
centrist conventionality of legal process in the 1970s. According to 
law and economics scholars, the problem was a lack of real world ana-
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lytic rigor. Hart and Sacks built implicit ideals of New Deal social 
reformism into the judicial task of "reasoned elaboration." Ad hoc 
judicial regulation of economic relations between manufacturers and 
consumers or carriers arid shippers exemplified this task. Such at-
tempts were all misguided at best and mush at worst. From a more 
systematic view, such piecemeal social reform was counterproductive. 
The market would swallow up all attempts at legal reform. Indeed, 
using the market as an objective ground, determinate predictions 
could be made as to the social effects of particular legal rules, and the 
history of the law itself could be understood as the working out of a 
determinate drive toward market efficiency.20 7 
Where the right purported to attack from an objectivist base, the 
left attacked from an antipositivist ground. What the center had taken 
as simply pragmatic and technical questions of whether to regulate by 
rules or standards, or through negligence or strict liability, were not 
simply technical questions at all, but implicated fundamental ideolo-
gies about social life.208 Moreover, the liberal image of achieving jus-
tice through the distribution of legal rights was incoherent because it 
rested on the same public/private formalism that the realists had al-
ready demonstrated was indeterminate. Rights discourse was analyti-
cally zero sum; appeals always existed to contradictory claims to 
rights to freedom of action and rights to security from harm.209 
Which appeal to recognize in a particular context depended on more 
than the commitment to legal rights themselves. Law might be under-
stood, not as the rational accommodation of conflicting social inter-
ests, but as the site for the production of a ruling ideology about the 
necessity for the existing arrangements in social life.210 
More than the contrasting attack on the process; ideology defined 
the polarity between law and economics and critical legal studies. 
There was also important ideological baggage associated with the con-
trast between methodology - the determinate, hard-edged, quasi-sci-
entific rigor of economics and the indeterminate, socially-constructed, 
anti-objectivist tenor of CLS scholarship. Thus, rather than attacking 
the market ideology of the Right as based on the "wrong" values, or 
from a traditionally liberal ground as the impermissible imposition of 
value itself, critical legal studies focused on the claims of representa-
tion, on the preterisions of law and economists to be able to describe 
207. See, e.g., R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 359 (3d. ed. 1986). 
208. See Kennedy, supra note 195. 
209. See Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 956 (1982). 
210. See Gordon, supra note 5. 
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and predict a world separate from the metaphors used to comprehend 
and interpret that world. Against the idea that preferences simply ex-
ist separate from the act of interpretation and then are represented in 
Pareto-superior transactions, Mark Kelman argued that preferences 
could not be assumed to be exogenous to social structure.211 Similarly, 
CLS writers argued that the evaluation of levels of satisfaction under 
an efficiency analysis was always potentially indeterminate. Duncan 
Kennedy combined the indeterminacy of the choice between offer and 
asking prices with the elasticity of the concept of transaction costs to 
suggest that the efficiency calculus was inherently indeterminate. 
Third-party preferences of everyone could always be considered at 
either their offer or asking prices with widely different results in partic-
ular cases. Furthermore, the description of the status quo from which 
to identify a change in regimes was itself an indeterminate exercise. 
As a result, the potential Pareto-superior welfare calculus, the Kaldor-
Hicks test, was indeterminate.212 And finally, Kennedy and Frank 
Michelman systematized the critique to demonstrate that no efficiency 
conclusions could even be drawn about the basic ideas of private prop-
erty or free transferability.213 
We justify this absurdly brief and simplified description of the rise 
oflaw and economics and CLS in the 1970s, because our goal is not to 
consider the details of the arguments over the competing approaches, 
but instead simply to set the context for the appeai;ance of the New 
Public Law in the 1980s, in terms of the context over a polarized 
scholarly discourse divided on one dimension, and over the politics of 
representation that the realities introduced in American legal thought. 
E. The Social Construction Point 
We have been leading up to the argument that what connects vari-
ous aspects of the New Public Law scholarship together is an antiposi-
tivist stance toward interpretation. We here want to draw these 
connections more explicitly by developing some important possible 
consequences to be drawn from the idea that law is socially 
constructed. 
From a political theory point of view, perhaps the most important 
implication of New Public Law's embrace of the antipositivist position 
is its rejection of the public/private distinction as a coherent way of 
211. M. KELMAN, supra note 182 at 114-86. 
212. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
387 (1981). 
213. Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 
(1980). 
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thinking about political legitimacy and social order~ Critical legal 
scholars, radical feminists, and left scholars of color subscribe to a 
common analytic. They seek to debunk the foundational image of lib-
eral theory that the world can be divided into strict public and private 
spheres, and that the task of political and legal theory is to figure out 
how to protect the private realm from overreaching public power. 
Thus, the left critique of the market has emphasized that there is no 
analytically coherent distinction between the free market and social 
regulation. When the state purports simply to stay out of the market 
by refusing compensation for specific acts, it in fact creates legal privi-
leges to injure without the duty of paying compensation.214 In radical 
feminist literature, the idea that, without intervening, the state leaves 
family relations private has been debunked by the demonstration that 
such a posture creates a legal privilege on the part of wife-abusers to 
abuse without legal recourse.215 And similarly, the idea that color-
blind neutrality entails racial equality has been questioned by an 
emerging radical voice of color that sees white assumptions posing as 
neutral universals.216 
New Public Law scholars have utilized this kind of updated realist 
critique of liberalism to reject the image of the private sphere as some-
how natural or objective. Thus, borrowing from more radical analy-
ses, Cass Sunstein utilizes the Hohfeldian analytic to contend that the 
common law itself is a form of economic regulation and therefore can-
not be taken as a neutral baseline for evaluation.217 Accepting that 
there is no qualitative distinction between the market and regulation, 
Sunstein then proceeds to list the various factors he thinks are relevant 
to determining which mode of regulation to pursue; in his image, it is 
often largely a functional, technocratic task of fitting a regulation 
strategy to a particular empirical context. 
One implication of rejecting the positivist identification of a private 
realm is a general rejection of liberal ideas of economics and the mar-
ket. For example, an assumption of most neoclassical, liberal econom-
ics thinking is that tastes and preferences are exogenous to the market. 
Thus, rules adapt to exogenous preferences, not the other way around. 
This assumption flows from the particular premise that individuals ex-
ist as self-contained unique beings and are the analytic starting points 
214. See Singer, supra note 201. 
215. See Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985); 
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985). 
216. Crenshaw, supra note 185; Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal 
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989). 
217. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873, 880-82 (1987). 
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of economic theory. But just as the antipositivist tendencies of the 
New Public Law scholarship deny the sharp distinction between the 
private market and social regulation, they also incorporate what has 
long been the position of left, and particularly socialist, ontology, that 
the individual subject, including her tastes and preferences, exists in a 
dialectical relation to social context and social structure. To put this 
another way, no subject is separate from objective and external social 
conditions. Thus, instead of accepting the assumption of liberal the-
ory that the individual is the analytic starting point of social theory, 
New Public Law scholars conceive that individuals are formed and 
transformed in their social relations, and that it is social relations that 
give content and meaning to individuals. The theoretical correlate to 
this position is the assertion that tastes and preferences are endoge-
nous to social structure. In short, part of the left drift of New Public 
Law scholarship is rooted in these essentially communitarian ideas 
about identity formation. 
The commitment to a dialectical vision of the individual and the 
social structure and of the relation of economic markets to legal re-
gimes evidences a theoretical opposition to more general liberal oppo-
sitions between subjectivity and objectivity, self and other, market and 
regulation, private and public. This analytic is evident in other schol-
arly manifestations as well. Take, for example, the new hermeneutics 
in constitutional and statutory interpretation that we have described. 
Against the traditional image of a self-contained and positive text (a 
statute or constitution) capable of neutral, "accurate" interpretation 
by a disinterested reader, the New Public Law poses the image of a 
text as essentially open-ended and incomplete, having no determinate 
and positive meaning separate from its interpretation by judges and 
citizens. "Dynamic" statutory interpretation, the rejection of the old 
canons of interpretation, and the image of constitutional lawmaking as 
existing beyond the formal enactments of legislatures and courts are 
all pieces of the general rejection of a positive meaning capable of sim-
ply being represented by an observer who is otherwise separate from 
the text. Instead, representation is inevitably interpretation; a text has 
ho meaning separate from this process. The observer and the observed 
are dialectically linked. 
This adoption of a "postmodern" stance toward identity and inter-
pretation has been linked to a new "anti-formalism"218 in constitu-
tional scholarship. One can trace an increasingly anti-positivist 
218. See Tushnet, supra note 99. 
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development from Ely219 to Ackerman220 to Michelman221 in constitu-
tional scholarship. Compared to the simple assumption of the demo-
cratic character of American society to the earlier generation of 
process-oriented constitutional theorists, Ely's work seemed a critical 
breakthrough, demonstrating the legally created nature of the demo-
cratic decisionmaking process. But, to the extent that Ely ties his 
reading of the Constitution to the language of the document, Acker-
man's suggestion that focusing on the text improperly excludes what 
we should see as of constitutional moments such as the mobilization of 
political energy represented by the New Deal as the basis for interpre-
tation seems antiformalist.222 Certainly the New Deal represented a 
conceptual and social reordering. Moreover, Ackerman exposes the 
contingency of Ely's association of "democracy" with the extant legis-
lature through the identification of supra-majoritarian shifts in norms 
that were obviously also rooted in democratic, popular will. Com-
pared to Ely's text-based structure, Ackerman proposed deformalizing 
judicial review by resting it on something like the New Deal "mo-
ment" of popular, informal constitutional amendment.223 
Michelman could then continue the antipositivist practice by criti-
cizing Ackerman's limitation of popular constitutional lawmaking to 
extraordinary historical moments. According to Michelman, Acker-
man's invocation of such clearly bounded and identifiable "constitut-
ing moments" was itself a formalist, or "authoritarian" demand to 
abdicate responsibility by deferring to something outside and external 
to context. Such constitutional moments might be created at various 
times and their creation may itself depend on official recognition by 
the courts, Michelman suggests. Hence the idea of normativism is 
central to one version of New Public Law discourse. Responsibility 
could not be abstracted away by purporting to represent something 
external to the decisionmaker like a distant, dramatic, historical 
moment. In Michelman's extraordinary argument, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty was precisely flipped. The need to defer 
to a democratic decision meant that the judiciary must identify self-
governance on a nonformalist basis. One would not, for example in 
Warshow, simply defer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's deci-
sion simply because of its formal status. Instead, democratic moments 
219. See J. ELY, supra note 90. 
220. See supra note 99. 
221. See supra note 53. 
222. See Ackerman, supra note 98, at 1051-57. 
223. Id. 
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of social life can be identified outside official space, in social move-
ments or cultural change, and law has a role in its creation. 
Just as the representation of democracy was transformed from the 
legislature to the dialogic courts, the old legal process formalism about 
courts was being challenged in progressive public law scholarship. 
Specifically, this literature challenged Fuller's identification of the ju-
dicial role with nonpolycentric disputes.224 The ideas of public values 
in statutory interpretation similarly deformalized the conventional 
perception of the relationship between text and interpreter. 
In short, in our view, what ties New Public Law scholarship to 
CLS, and gives it the general flavor of a left and progressive tilt, is the 
embrace by New Public Law scholars of the critique of positivism that 
radical scholars have developed to criticize liberal theories of the mar-
ket, the self, knowledge, and interpretation. This critique has led to a 
general conception of the socially constructed character of the market, 
preferences, and assertions of truth that have recently been associated 
with "postmodernism." 
F. Different Things the Social Construction of Law Could Mean 
In this section, we briefly compare the different routes through 
which leftist and centrist scholars are arriving at the common ground 
of a critique of "positivism" or "foundationalism" or "jurispathic" in-
terpretative stances. We then describe what we think are the different 
implications that the "social construction of reality" might have. 
If we are right in our description so far, we can generally conclude 
that, in terms of intellectual premises, very little separates New Public 
Law and CLS scholars. And yet, work from the two approaches evi-
dences an unmistakable difference in tone and style. We believe that 
these differences are ultimately political and cultural. They have to do 
with the degree to which different people associate with an opposition-
ist rather than a reformist stance toward dominant institutional life 
that is difficult to "account" for. But there is also, we think, an ana-
lytic or intellectual correlate to the differences between the CLS and 
New Public Law postures that is more accessible. Let us start there. 
Although both New Public Law and CLS scholars make central 
the idea of the social construction of reality, of law, of individuals, of 
the market, and of what they call "democracy," this idea has different 
meanings for the two sets of scholars. These divergences can best be 
explicated from an analysis of the intellectual lineage through which 
both groups arrive at this idea. 
224. See Fiss, supra note 99. 
February 1991] New Public Law 781 
This issue is easiest to grasp by looking historically back to the 
realist critique of the liberty of contract ideology. When the realists 
debunked the liberty of contract era as "formalist," as "transcendental 
nonsense,'' the implication was that the old order thinkers had simply 
made an intellectual error. They mistook doctrines like "duress" and 
"mutual assent" in contracts, for example, as if they were real things 
existing in the world that the legal categories simply re-presented. Ex-
cept to suggest that the liberty of contract judges were ruling based on 
their personal preferences, the realists never tried to connect the "for-
malism" of the old order with a social theory that could explain why 
liberty of contract theorists might have made the "mistakes" they 
made. Nor did they articulate the significance, in terms of the consti-
tution of social power, such an approach might have made. This prob-
ably has been the greatest difference between the legal realists and the 
CLS work. While the realists were content to delegitimate the pur-
ported neutrality and objectivity of the old order (in order to clear the 
ideological space for governmental regulation, the New Deal, and gov-
ernance through administrative agencies and policy-oriented courts), 
CLS scholars have utilized the realist deconstructive analytic to begin 
a discussion about the ideology and politics of law. Although empha-
sizing different factors in the role that law plays to constitute the terms 
of social power and the boundaries of what gets perceived as just or 
unjust, CLS writers by and large have connected the internal intellec-
tual critique of liberal legal and political thought to the outer experi-
ence of social life and the application of social power. Rather than see 
the claims of law to objectivity, neutrality, and determinacy as simply 
intellectual mistakes, they have found in mainstream legal doctrine the 
elements of an ideological discourse for representing and interpreting 
the social world. This discourse works as one mode of social power. 
To put this another way, CLS scholars have approached law from 
the viewpoint of social theory, and have asked how the law generally 
works to appear neutral and noncontroversial despite the intellectual 
emptiness of such claims. And by pursuing a vision of legal discourse 
either as legitimating a particular form of social relations225 or as em-
bodying the political struggle over how to describe and understand 
social life, CLS work is absorbed with the political character of law, 
and the manner in which claims to neutrality, objectivity, and determi-
nacy - the aspects of legal discourse that we have called positivist -
work to deny and repress this political, socially constitutive quality of 
law. The debunking of pretensions to some rational or scientific way 
225. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 
(1976); C. MAcKINNoN, supra note 114. 
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to generate legal results, the critique of positivism in law, has been part 
of a project to politicize law, to expose the social conflict and power 
dimensions obscured by universalist interpretations of social life. 
This conflict-oriented, politicizing character of CLS work distin-
guishes it most profoundly from New Public Law scholarship. New 
Public Law scholarship is oriented to consensus rather than conflict, 
to rationalizing rather than politicizing legal issues. This commitment 
to consensus and rationalization characterizes the emphasis of New 
Public Law scholarship on pragmatic deliberation and diversity. Once 
one abandons the centralizing and universalizing claims to foundation-
alist law, once one gets beyond the formalist limitations that liberal 
legal thought imposed, once the proper safeguards against factional-
ization are in place, and once all relevant viewpoints are empatheti-
cally "attended to," then the polity, or the judge as surrogate for 
community deliberation, can reach a result that gives credence to the 
widely different places that we occupy in the social structure. 
This ultimate consensus-orientation of New Public Law scholar-
ship underlies the tension we articulated at the beginning of this Part. 
The rejection of traditional notions of objectivity and neutrality leads 
these scholars to emphasize "normativity." Commitment to a norma-
tive program has, at least since the realists, implied commitment to 
politicization. But an aversion to conflict drives the other side of the 
tension, the idea that justice exists in procedures and conversations 
and deliberations which ultimately will yield just results. Like many 
realists, New Public Law scholars tend to see the issues of positivism 
and formalism as mistakes that past elites have made in managing the 
reins of formal social power rather than themselves factors in the 
economy of social power, the link between neutrality and power 
presented as law. And their solution, stated most generally, is to cor-
rect those mistakes by substituting a new, deformalized, and free-
wheeling decisionmaking process. Thus, even Frank Michelman, ar-
guably the New Public Law scholar most committed to an antiposi-
tivist position, comprehends his work as "republican-inspired" and 
"process-based."226 If we are right about all this, then we can expect 
the critical intellectual issues within the New Public Law to revolve 
around the issue of cultural conflict, of how to choose one description 
of the actual experience of social reality over another. 
For many, part of the appeal of the New Public Law approach is 
the implicit suggestion that accommodation to the diversity of social 
voices can itself avoid cultural conflict. Thus, in our discussion of the 
226. Michelman, supra note 171, at 1537. 
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Gay Rights Coalition case, we utilized as a New Public Law exemplar 
the way that Judge Mack sought responsibly to address the conflicting 
issues of community identity presented by gay students and George-
town as a Catholic university. 
The New Public Law suggests a resolution of this kind of social 
conflict in one sense by according a normative status to processes of 
decisionmaking (informed deliberation, openness to diversity of views, 
and accommodation). Like Frank Michelman's invocation of Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in the Goldman case,227 our analysis of Judge 
Mack's opinion focused on these characteristics. But once the anti-
objectivist project gets going, it is difficult to contain. How would one 
recognize a legitimate decision in the Gay Rights Coalition case from 
the criterion of "attending to the dignity of each community"? Even 
beyond the acknowledgement that the case involves "conflicting 
norms," it seems clear that if we continue to the process of the 
postmodern interpretivism that the New Public Law proclaims, it 
seems especially limited to see the case as a simple collision of the self-
goveming dignity of two communities - gay students and the Catho-
lic integrity of Georgetown University. Even identifying the conflict 
as such is an ideologically and culturally driven social construct, since 
it is simple to imagine other ways to describe the context. Just as it 
was possible to imagine a realist-inspired critique of objectivist appli-
cations of the necessity defense in Warshow, it is possible here to 
problematize any particular identification of the communities vying 
for self-governance in the Gay Rights Coalition case. For example, one 
cannot take the integrity of the Catholic doctrine on homosexuality as 
a "given" value important for Catholic self-governance, since the issue 
is a point of struggle within the Catholic community itself, and the 
court's treatment of the case in fact will become at least one small 
factor in that struggle.228 Similarly, the legitimacy of the university to 
operate a decentralized, autonomous cultural institution within the 
community of Washington, D.C., is also not self-evident. To the ex-
tent the university plays important roles in both the material and sym-
bolic economies of power within Washington-roles it has cultivated 
as part of its drive for national elite recognition - it is arguable that it 
cannot be seen simply as a "Catholic university." 
Situating the cultural conflict in the Washington urban scene also 
brings into relief the connection of the issue of the legitimacy of 
Georgetown's autonomy from municipal human rights regulation with 
227. Michelman, supra note 53. 
228. See supra note 144. 
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American racial politics, given that part of the University's identity is 
as one of the "national" and largely white institutions located within a 
largely African-American community. More deeply, the "accommo-
dation" reached by the court's decision in the Gay Rights Coalition 
case may in fact insult both communities. For mainstream Catholic 
self-identity, the formal lack of university "recognition" may be just 
that, a formalism; the court's requirement that university facilities be 
made available is surely offensive to some Catholics. For gay students, 
the degrading symbolism of differential nonrecognition by the univer-
sity may be more insidious than the functional question of access to 
facilities, in light of the lack of historic ties between homophobia and 
systematic economic degradation. Finally, it is not clear that partici-
pation in dialogue will transform the conflict over gay rights in the 
Catholic community into a transformative new accommodation. A 
difficult political, cultural choice to "kill" the aspirations of one or the 
other relevant communities may be inevitable in this interpretation of 
the context. And there may be no way even to describe the context 
that is not already situated in some structure of power. 
In short, once the commitment to an antiobjectivist practice is 
made, it should be immediately clear that in a case like the Gay Stu-
dents Coalition case the very act of describing the dignity and cultural 
conflict at issue reintroduces significant issues of politics, power, and 
ideology. Neither the "Catholic community," "gay and lesbian stu-
dents," nor "Georgetown University" are autonomous, free-standing 
cultural givens. Their identities as communities are issues of constant 
struggle and conflict, and those struggles in turn will be influenced by 
how the judiciary responds. Just as the realists argued that rights 
could not be the ground for legal decisions since they were the conse-
quence of legal decisions, neither can community identity in a republi-
can ideal of "self-governance" provide the support for a simple 
diversity approach to the Gay Students Coalition conflict, since the le-
gitimacy of each community is, in part, precisely what is at issue in the 
case. 
Deformalizing the sources of law to include a hermeneutic story 
about a statute's meaning, or to encompass the daily acts of constitu-
tional lawmaking that occur in the streets, schools, workplaces, and 
bedrooms of American social life, cannot in and of itself avoid political 
choice. 
In contrast to the CLS movement, whose goal of politicizing law 
tends to be associated with a general political project of resistance-to 
status quo forms of social power, the New Public Law is characterized 
by a common attempt to stop analytically short of the radical implica-
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tions of an antipositivist, postmodernist intellectual culture, and ulti-
mately to depoliticize questions like those posed in Gay Students 
Coalition. On the one hand, what gives the New Public Law scholar-
ship its left-tilted flavor is the adoption of postmodernism as an inter-
pretative and epistemological position. Like the left, New Public Law 
scholars are identified with an intellectual opposition to objectivism, 
formalism, and positivism. In this dimension, the New Public Law 
scholarship completes the process begun in one sense by the legal real-
ists. The realist project of demonstrating the political and socially 
constructed character of law was domesticated by early legal process 
theorists who contained the realist antiformalism to substantive ques-
tions. Beginning most vividly in constitutional scholarship with Ely, 
and culminating in the work of Michelman, New Public Law scholars 
for the last fifteen years have been steadily eroding the process synthe-
sis by extending the realist debunking from substance to procedure. 229 
On the other hand, New Public Law scholarship is distinct from 
the left in its moderation of the implications of the postmodern situa-
tion. The rhetorical manifestation of this dynamic is the notion that 
CLS is "not positive" or "goes too far." The conceptual manifestation 
is the point at which New Public Law scholars characteristically 
transform political, cultural, and ideological conflict into a realm of 
discourse -'--- republican dialogue and deliberation - in which the par-
ticular conflicts are re-imagined in the context of a broader, universal 
interest in community and understanding. 
There are four strategies followed by New Public Law scholarship 
that are distinguished by their respective attempts to dedicate the so-
cial conflicts exposed by critique of institutional formalism. We will 
discuss these four strategies in the order of their relationship to the 
objectivist tradition. 
The most objectivist-oriented response is the technocratic one; in 
this kind or work, the assumption is that conflict is more apparent 
than real once all the "facts" are collected, or once the "distortions" 
identified by public choice analytics are accounted for. The animating 
idea here is that there is a functionally normative resolution to social 
conflict available.230 But most New Public Law scholars believe that 
something more is at stake than "balancing and accommodating the 
relevant values" in a case like the Gay Students Coalition. Somewhat 
229. See, e.g., Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. 
L. REv. 1015 (1978). 
230. See, for example, the emphasis on information collection, and on the functional correla-
tion or typology of market failure and kind of regulatory response, in C. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990). 
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less objectivist and more politically progressive is a second sub-genre 
of New Public Law that attempts to find the normative grounding im-
manent in the social world itself; the idea here is to ensure "coher-
ence" between law and nonformalistically identified social values. But 
if simple coherence is the test, then the New Public Law would de-
volve into a kind of proceduralism where the only critical requirement 
was to listen to interested parties about how disputes should be re-
solved. The pragmatic, antiformalist test of "hanging together," of co-
herence with social understandings, also cannot avoid political choice 
in a situation of conflict. On the interpretivist assumptions of New 
Public Law scholars, the identification of progressive social meanings 
cannot be governed by something "outside" the act of interpretation; 
that is the flight from responsibility that Michelman articulates.231 As 
Margaret Radin has argued, if the deformalized lawmaking is justified 
by its "coherence" with informal norms and understandings in society, 
nothing in the pragmatic stance distinguishes between "bad coher-
ence," that is, coherence with existing structures of domination and 
illegitimate hierarchy, from "good coherence," that is, coherence with 
progressive and liberating strands of modern life. 232 
Radin's own solution is to meld pragmatism with a particular form 
of cultural feminism which contends truth can be found in the experi-
ence of dominated females - but such an approach tends toward a 
"third-worldism" that became fashionable in the 1960s. Within that 
school, the discourse of the oppressed was valorized as containing au-
thenticity simply from the experience of oppression itself. Other New 
Public Law approaches in this sub-genre include the idea that simple 
empathy with the position of the "other," or a focus on concrete expe-
rience rather than abstract legalism, can somehow be the ground for 
an acceptable resolution of social conflict. The animating idea behind 
these approaches is that injustice flows from a kind of narrow-minded-
ness that can be cured by truly attending to the perspectives of others, 
with the implicit assumption that multiplying perspectives to achieve 
"perspectivalism"233 will bring one closer and closer to the truth of a 
situation. 234 
Michelman exemplifies yet a fourth sub-genre of New Public Law 
scholarship. Taking the antipositivist critique to its existential impli-
cations, Michelman rests the authority of social decisionmaking on the 
231. Michelman, supra note 53. 
232. Radin, supra note 153, at 1710. 
233. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 55, at 76-82. 
234. For a critique of the optimism of this kind of intellectual pluralism, see Ehrenreich, 
Pluralist Myths/Powerless Men, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990). 
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good faith conviction of the decisionmaker who has overcome bad 
faith reliance on some authority divorced from her own influence (the 
jurispathic) and instead taken moral responsibility for her relationship 
to the social conflict of a case like Gay Rights Coalition. In the family 
of New Public Law strategies, Michelman's position on the left of the 
group is related to the degree of his embrace of postmodern epistemol-
ogy: In his vision, there is no objective and free-standing basis for the 
exercise of social power, only the thoroughly decent norm of respect-
ing the communities outside of one's own. Part of the New Public 
Law's motivation and discourse is a desire to avoid a politicized legal 
discourse that has been the aim of CLS scholarship. Instead, New 
Public Law scholars favor images of dialogue, diversity, and pragmatic 
reasoning to achieve just social results. These scholars have borrowed 
the analytics of the realists and CLS in order to deformalize the cen-
trist legal ideology that process theorists in the 1950s developed. 
Given the change in historical situation, demonstrating the objectivity 
of the procedural inquiry is simply not as important as it was in the 
post-war period, and thus formalism has lost its usefulness. And thus 
we have the beginnings of a process-oriented discourse that has as its 
centerpiece an informal, open-ended, and antipositivist view of process 
itself. 
G. Centrism as a Postmodern Cultural Form 
The intellectual context we have described, of polarized discourse 
and ideological estrangement with the collapse of a center, was (is) not 
peculiar to law. The story of a 1950s pluralist consensus around 
proceduralism and pragmatics with an undercurrent assumption of 
fundamental consensus that would weaken in the 1960s, and explode 
into polarized movements in the 1970s and 1980s, actually describes a 
strand of the contemporary history of dominant American intellectual 
life generally. Although the particular spin is different in each field, 
this basic structure captures the fractures across the intellectual space. 
In literary criticism, for example, the pluralist movement in the 1950s 
was represented by New Criticism, a loose, pragmatic and pluralist-
oriented critical practice whose main object was to interpret the text in 
terms of its inner meaning and interconnections. In the late 1960s and 
1970s, this kind of criticism, which seemed so exciting in the 1940s 
and early 1950s, would seem to run out of steam and inspiration the 
further it was from its founding conflict with older, essentialist-ori-
ented critical techniques. Structuralism represented the first radical 
threat to the New Criticism that would finally culminate in the more 
radical deconstruction claims of Derrida, De Man, and their follow-
788 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:707 
ers.235 Just as law and economics reflects in law a right-wing reaction 
to both the mushy center and the radical left, so too has the rise of 
deconstructive critical approaches in literary criticism spawned a con-
servative traditionalist reaction. This conservative movement is char-
acterized by calls for a return to the integrity of the text, imagined as 
either the intent of the author, or a new attention to literalism and 
objectivism in interpretation.236 
In history, the 1950s methodology was explicitly consensus-ori-
ented,237 to be challenged by the late 1960s and early 1970s by both 
neo-Marxists, who uncovered the social struggles suppressed by the 
benign consensus stories of teleological progress, and by wilder, specu-
lative genealogies and histories produced in Europe by Michel Fou-
cault and others.238 The radical challenges to the boundaries of 
historiography produced its own reaction in new conservative histori-
ans looking toward a classical development and telos, as represented 
by followers of Leo Strauss and others.239 And philosophy, anthropol-
ogy and psychological theory have followed a similar path. 240 
The politicization of legal discourse in the 1970s and early 1980s, · 
and the increasing sense of ideological polarization with no center 
around which to orient positions, is not unique to law. Instead it re-
flects a broader dynamic in late twentieth-century Western intellectual 
life. It is part of a large-scale injection of what has been called the 
postmodern cultural situation. There is nothing inevitable to the form 
that intellectual disputes have taken that accounts for their structural 
similarity across disciplinary lines. Rather, this unity exists because, 
the same issue is being contested in the various fields - the politiciza-
tion of authority occasioned by the tendency of recently authoritative 
discourses, claiming objectivity, to become unstable and vulnerable, 
or, the postmodern critique of the continuity of identity has been 
pressed. 
235. See F. LENTRICCHIA, AF:rER THE NEW CRmCISM (1980); J. CULLER, ON DECON· 
STRUCTION: THEORY AND CRmCISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982); T. HAWKES, STRUC· 
TURALISM AND SEMIOTICS (1987). 
236. See, e.g., E. HIRSH, THE AIM OF INTERPRETATION (1976). 
237. D. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN PoLmCS (1953). 
238. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1971); 
M. FOUCAULT, THE HlsrORY OF SEXUALITY (1978). 
239. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953); A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OP THE 
AMERICAN MIND (1987); A. GEWIRTH, REAsoN AND MORALITY (1978). 
240. See, e.g., ]. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans. 1976); ]. DERRIDA, SE-
LECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (R. Guba & G. Spivak eds. 1988); E. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978); 
C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE CooKED (1970); C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OP 
CULTURES (1973); ]. PIAGET, STRUCTURALISM (1970); ]. PIAGET, WRITING CULTURES, THE 
POETICS AND POLmCS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (J. Clifford & G. Marcus eds. 1986). 
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The characteristic that movements like the New Public Law in 
legal scholarship, Gadamarian "hermeneutics" in the humanities, and 
"pragmatism" in philosophy share is that they all constitute a particu-
lar, recognizable way of situating oneself vis-a-vis the similar break-
down of traditional authoritative discourses in their respective 
fields.241 In one dimension, they can be understood as exemplars of 
ideological centrism - they seek in each manifestation to recover and 
reconstitute something like a reasonable center, distinct from the ex-
tremes of ideology that define the right and the left. 
But the idea of centrism does not fully capture the sense of linkage 
we are getting at. In addition, a significant feature of this intellectual 
tendency is that it is situated within a particular cultural matrix where 
various practices - vaguely linked together as "postmodernism" -
have destabilized their respective disciplinary discourses. In short, the 
"center" chosen by the New Public Law is a distinctly postmodern 
ceriter; the New Public Law is one manifestation of a new quasi-cul-
tural social form that is associated with the appearance of 
postmodernism as a presence in American intellectual life. In other 
words, the postmodernism condition is constituted, not only by its 
radical avant garde - CLS in law, for example, or deconstructionism 
in literary criticism - but also by a particular, recognizable attempt to 
moderate and stabilize, to constitute a center sophisticated enough to 
comprehend the postmodern stance but nevertheless reformist enough 
to believe that it doesn't make all that much difference after all. Just 
as the legal process theorists constructed a center to legal thought by 
incorporating elements of the radical critique of the realists, while re-
jecting the more radical implications of realist thought, so the New 
Public Law is searching for a center by, in part, absorbing major ele-
ments of the radical critical legal studies approach, while attempting 
to avoid the more radical implications of that body of work. 
This depiction of the New Public Law as a postmodern cultural 
form finally allows us to address what we believe ultimately distin-
guished the New Public Law movement - their respective positions 
on the map of American intellectual culture. We believe that there is a 
superficial liberal critique of the New Public Law that demands to 
know the "ground" for the normative approach that New Public Law 
scholars proclaim, and would reject the movement because of its fail-
ure to provide an objective, neutral basis for decisionmaking. Since we 
find the New Public Law's embrace of antipositivism to be a strength, 
rather than a weakness, we find such a critique beside the point, unless 
241. Among representative scholars we would include from various disciplines are Richard 
Rorty, Clifford Geertz, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
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the critic were to articulate her own neutral, objective discourse. On 
the other hand, the inquiry as to where the cultural norms of delibera-
tion, tolerance, and openness are rooted does lead to the core of the 
left critique: the sense that when New Public Law scholars like Ack-
erman invoke the New Deal as a "constitutional moment," or when 
Michelman invokes the civil rights movement as if it represented some 
particular, identifiable norm, and when they speak of dialogue under 
ideal speech situations free from coercion and full of mutual respect, 
they are mistaking as a universal form of dialogue what is really the 
cultural motif of the largely white and relatively affiuent college edu-
cated who place themselves vaguely on the progressive side of Ameri-
can politics. For example, there are many ways to comprehend what 
"the civil rights movement" meant, ranging from the social commit-
ment to equality that New Public Law scholars emphasize, to a critical 
interpretation that sees in the integrationist ideology of a case like 
Brown the repudiation of other possibilities for African-American self-
determination. 242 The "lessons of the civil rights movement" also do 
not simply exist, in some objective form, available to utilize as evi-
dence of a progressive and liberatory republican strand of American 
constitutionalism. In other words, it is not that the norms advocated 
by the New Public Law scholars are not thoroughly decent and well-
intentioned. The problem is that New Public Law scholars stop short 
of recognizing their inevitable politically created quality, and thus 
tend ultimately to subdue what the left believes the project of criticism 
is all about. The move to moderation and stability, in short, is a move 
towards consensus about social norms that the left believes present 
political and contested issues - issues that are prematurely "accom-
modated" or "attended to" in the new postmodern centrism that has 
as its cultural form a kind of "good-guyism" or lay correlate to the 
reasonableness that presbyterianism represents in the religious sphere. 
CONCLUSION 
We have tried in this article to describe what we see as a new genre 
of legal scholarship, and to situate that genre in relation both to the 
history of legal discourse that preceded its appearance, and the other 
contemporary movements in law from which it is distinguished. 
Given our respective intellectual and political commitments, we have 
different ultimate evaluations of this movement. But we both agree 
that the New Public Law scholarship is an important intellectual re-
242. See H. CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL (1967); Calmore, Fair 
Housing v. Fair Busing: The Problems with Providing Increased Housing Opportunities through 
Spatial decentralization, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE R.Ev. 7 (1980); Peller, supra note 4. 
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finement of the legal process analytic on which it builds, and that the 
work simultaneously carries the risk of depoliticizing the aspects of 
radical scholarship that it incorporates. We think it appropriate to 
add here, however, that whatever intellectual and ideological issues 
separate this work from CLS, there is obviously a great deal of room 
for both intellectual and political alliance in specific contexts. A quick 
review of the actual political stances taken by well-known members of 
the New Public Law movement reveals that they have often been po-
litically allied with the left, even if the left believes their scholarship 
might ultimately be apologetic and New Public Law scholars believe 
that CLS underestimates the possibilities of accommodation. Our own 
experience as colleagues has left us hopeful about the benefits of such 
alliances - and dialogue. 
